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BOARDS-R-US: RECONCEPTUALIZING CORPORATE BOARDS
Stephen M. Bainbridge and M. Todd Henderson*
Abstract
State corporate law requires director services be provided by “natural persons.”
This Article puts this obligation to scrutiny, and concludes that there are significant gains
that could be realized by permitting firms (be they partnerships, corporations, or other
business entities) to provide board services. We call these firms “board service providers”
(BSPs). We argue that hiring a BSP to provide board services instead of a loose group of
sole proprietorships will increase board accountability, both from markets and judicial
supervision. The potential economies of scale and scope in the board services industry
(including vertical integration of consultants and other board member support functions),
as well as the benefits of risk pooling and talent allocation, mean that large professional
director services firms may arise, and thereby create a market for corporate governance
distinct from the market for corporate control. More transparency about board
performance, including better pricing of governance by the market, as well as increased
reputational assets at stake in board decisions, means improved corporate governance,
all else being equal. But our goal in this Article is not necessarily to increase shareholder
control over firms—we show how a firm providing board services could be used to
increase managerial power as well. This shows the neutrality of our proposed reform,
which can therefore be thought of as a reconceptualization of what a board is rather than
a claim about the optimal locus of corporate power.
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Professor of Law and Aaron Director Teaching Scholar, University of Chicago Law School, respectively.
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“[Alexander] Hamilton would have no trouble recognizing the corporate board of
today. The structure and composition of boardrooms have changed surprisingly little in
200 years.” 1
I. Introduction
Corporate boards of directors are one of the most important institutions in our
capitalist system. This is because state law requires boards intermediate the relation
between “ownership” and “control” of the corporation. 2 Separating capital and
management is thought to be a source of efficiency, since those with capital may not be
best positioned to manage publicly held firms. 3 But the separation generates the potential
for opportunism, since managers may be less careful spending other people’s money than
they would their own. 4 To optimize the tradeoff between management efficiency and
opportunism, shareholders elect boards of directors to supervise management of the firm
by corporate officers. 5 Although day-to-day decisions are made by managers, directors
are obligated to make fundamental decisions, like hiring and firing the managers, setting
compensation incentives, raising capital, and entering into mergers and acquisitions. 6
This latter category of decisions routinely involves high stakes and potential conflicts
among corporate stakeholders, making the board the place where legal rules about
corporate governance have the most relevance. 7
In recognition of the centrality of the board in corporate governance, judicial
control of corporate activities is almost exclusively affected through review of board

1

Robert A.G. Monks & Nell Minow, Corporate Governance 256 (2012).
See generally Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property 84-89 (1932) (discussing separation of ownership and control in public corporations).
3
See, e.g., Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1558 (D.C. 1984) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting “the efficiencies generated by the separation of ownership and control which account
for much of the success and popularity of the corporate form”); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the
Theory of the Firm, 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288, 289 (1980) (opining that the “separation of security ownership
and control can be explained as an efficient form of economic organization”).
4
See Berle & Means, supra note 2, at 6 (stating: “The separation of ownership from control
produces a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge and
where many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear.”).
5
State law mandates that “the business and affairs” of every corporation be managed by or under
the direction of a board of directors. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann., tit. 8, § 141(a); see generally Mod. Bus.
Corp. Act. Ann. § 8.01 at TBA (TBA) (providing a summary of comparable state corporation code
provisions). In turn, state law provides that the board shall be elected by shareholders. As such, “corporate
law provides for a separation of control and ownership.” Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del.1998).
6
As early as 1922, the Delaware Chancery Court held that the directors’ role was one of
supervision and control, with the detailed conduct of the business being a matter that properly could be
delegated to subordinate employees. Cahall v. Lofland, 114 A. 224, 229 (Del. Ch. 1921), aff’d, 118 A. 1
(Del. 1922). The board, however, retains the power to hire and fire firm employees and to define the limits
of their authority. Moreover, certain extraordinary acts may not be delegated, but are instead reserved for
the board’s exclusive determination. See, e.g., Lee v. Jenkins Bros., 268 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1959); Lucy v.
Hero Int’l Corp., 281 N.E.2d 266 (Mass. 1972).
7
Managerial decisions, like whether to sell particular products or enter particular markets, are
thought to be difficult and costly for courts to scrutinize ex post, as well as adequately policed by market
forces. Board decisions, on the other hand, present opportunities for expropriation of corporate assets or
opportunities by particular firm stakeholders, and courts are thought to be able to police these with greater
accuracy and less cost.
2
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decisions and refinement of board duties to shareholders. 8 Through their review of board
actions in connection with mergers, executive compensation, supervision of firm risk,
approval of conflicted transactions, and so on, state courts have created many of the basic
rules of corporate governance. 9
Legislation (from both states and the federal government), as well as private rules
from stock exchanges, also focuses on optimizing corporate governance through attempts
to perfect the board and optimally define its position in the corporate decision-making
hierarchy. 10 For instance, in response to numerous corporate scandals during the late
1990s, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 required, among other things, that all listed
companies have audit committees composed entirely of independent directors. 11
Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
implemented numerous corporate governance reforms, including new disclosures about
consultants working for boards and about compensation of directors, as well as new
independence standards for board compensation committees. 12
Influencing boards is the primary focus of good governance advocates of various
kinds, as well. Proxy advisor firms, like Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and
Glass, Lewis & Company, spend considerable resources trying to improve corporate
governance by giving shareholders information about how they should vote in director
elections. For instance, ISS sells institutional shareholders recommendations on how to
vote for every director of large publicly traded firms based on firm policies regarding
areas ranging from executive compensation to corporate strategy. 13 Although the power
of ISS and the other proxy advisor firms is disputed, 14 it is without doubt that their ability
to influence corporate behavior is cabined by the current corporate governance structure.
Because shareholders have limited ability to directly effect change, much of their
power—and thus that of ISS and its ilk—derives from voting on director elections. 15
The importance of the board of directors is further illustrated by the considerable
extent to which academics hoping to improve corporate governance focus on the role and
8

See Seinfeld v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 119 (Del. 2006) (“Delaware
corporate law provides for a separation of legal control and ownership. … The common law imposes
fiduciary duties upon the directors of Delaware corporations to constrain their conduct when discharging
that statutory responsibility.”).
9
Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate
Charters, 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1061, 1074 (2000) (noting that “the majority of Delaware's important legal
rules are the result of judicial decisions”).
10
One of us has elsewhere examined at length recent legislative efforts to influence corporate
governance, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Governance After the Financial Crisis (2012).
11
See id. at 141-42 (discussing Sarbanes-Oxley § 301’s requirements with respect to audit
committees of public corporations).
12
See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Corporate Governance Provisions of Dodd-Frank,
Engage, November 2010, at 29 (discussing Dodd-Frank corporate governance provisions applicable to
public corporations).
13
See Bainbridge, supra note 10, at 255 (“Today, ISS services some 1700 institutional investor
clients, which collectively manage some $25 trillion in equity securities.”).
14
See Stephen Choi. et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 Emory L.J. 869
(2010) (arguing that “popular accounts substantially overstate the influence of ISS” and that “ the impact of
an ISS recommendation is reduced greatly once company- and firm-specific factors important to investors
are taken into consideration”).
15
See Harrah's Entertainment, Inc. v. JCC Holding Co., 802 A.2d 294, (Del.Ch. 2002) (opining
that “the election of directors may be the most ... important action[ ] that shareholders can take”).
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composition of the board. 16 Almost every corporate governance reform proposed over the
past several decades has focused on the board of directors. 17 The central academic debate
is whether boards have too much control over corporate affairs, too little, or just the right
amount. 18 This battle is fought on the grounds of who board members are, whether they
are independent, who appoints them, how they are elected, how they are compensated,
what the standards for their conduct and liability are, whether there should be more
independent directors, what the optimal board size is, and so forth. 19 All of these are an
attempt to optimize the monitoring and governance role played by the board. 20
Despite the long and zealous efforts of corporate law reformers to understand and
improve the board of directors, there is a gaping hole in the corporate governance
literature. No one has yet questioned a fundamental assumption of the current corporate
governance model—that is, only individuals, acting as sole proprietors, provide
professional board services. To be sure, there seem to be legal reasons why this is the
case. For example, state law seems to require directors to be natural persons, as do the
provisions of federal law pertaining to corporate governance and the listing requirements
of stock exchanges. 21 This Article puts these obligations to scrutiny, asking whether this
requirement makes sense. To do so, it posits a novel alternative: board services could be
provided by other entities, be they partnerships, corporations, limited liability
corporations, or any other type of business association. We call these firms “board
16

See, e.g., Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 Wake Forest L. Rev. 783, 785
(2011) (“Numerous corporate law scholars have critically examined the structure and functions of the board
of directors and have evaluated the relative success of various board compositions.”); John Haberstroh,
Activist Institutional Investors, Shareholder Primacy, and the HP-Compaq Merger, 24 Hamline J. Pub. L.
& Pol'y 65, 81 (2002) (explaining that “since the mid-1970s corporate law academics and shareholder
activists have effectively lobbied to refashion boards of directors”); Thomas W. Joo, Corporate Governance
and the “D-Word,” 63 Wash. & Lee. L. Rev. 1579, 1579 (2006) (asserting that “most corporate law
academics have come to agree with Berle and Means' famous descriptive argument that corporate
decisionmaking power is denied to shareholders and is instead heavily concentrated in the board of
directors and upper management”);
17
See, e.g., Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Corporate Governance and the Board of
Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 101, 102 (1985)
(noting that corporate board reform proposals typically emphasize changes to board composition and
independence); Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. Corp. L. 447, 452 (2008)
(“Corporate governance reforms generally presume (1) that outside independent boards are better than nonindependent boards, and (2) that the more independent a board is, the better.”).
18
See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev.
833 (2005) (arguing in favor of greater shareholder empowerment); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director
Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1735 (2006) (arguing for limits on
shareholder power); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to
Bebchuk's Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1759 (2006) (same).
19
See generally, J.W. Verret, Pandora's Ballot Box, Or a Proxy with Moxie? Majority Voting,
Corporate Ballot Access, and the Legend of Martin Lipton Re-Examined, 62 Bus. Law. 1007, 1021-29
(2007) (providing a brief history of the “tug of war between managers and shareholders”).
20
See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation 170-85 (1976) (arguing that
board reforms focused on director independence would improve monitoring of management); Lisa M.
Fairfax, Sarbanes-Oxley, Corporate Federalism, and the Declining Significance of Federal Reforms on
State Director Independence Standards, 31 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 381, 387 (2005) (noting that the SarbanesOxley Act, for example, “focused on director independence” and sought to “eliminate those ties that
hindered directors ability to objectively monitor corporate officers”).
21
See infra Part V.
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service providers” (BSPs). To be clear, we do not have in mind individual board
members forming professional corporations to get the protection of limited liability, but
rather all director services being provided by a single firm. In other words, just as
companies outsource their external audit function to an accounting firm rather than
multiple individuals, the board of directors function would be outsourced to a
professional service company.
It is a unique and, we think, odd feature of corporate governance that there are
laws requiring board services to be provided by sole proprietorships. We do not see these
in other areas: lawyers, doctors, accountants, management consultants, and other
providers of professional services routinely form business associations to provide their
services because of some well-understood benefits. Associations allow individuals to
pool their resources to share risks, obtain gains from economies of scale and scope,
optimize the deployment of various resources across space and time, devote time and
effort to innovation, and develop large reputational assets that can constrain opportunism.
These benefits seem as applicable or even more so in the context of corporate
director services. Although discussed more fully below, a few of these are worth
mentioning to see the idea. Board members face substantial legal risk from their service,
and pooling this risk through associations may make the costs of board service lower.
Conversely, however, outsourcing the board may also make fiduciary duties more robust.
If directors are not as afraid to serve as professionals in a firm as they are to serve as
individuals, then courts may be less reluctant to hold them liable. In addition, a firm
serving as a board increases the number of monitors of board functions—both the
shareholders of the underlying company and of the BSP would be interested in the quality
of corporate governance decisions for any given company. A BSP may be a more
effective way to hold directors accountable, and thereby improve corporate governance.
Outsourcing the board function may also create a new labor market for
disciplining firms. Currently, there is no real market for corporate director talent.
Directors find their way onto boards largely through personal connections or the opaque
headhunter process, and because votes are private and decisions are made collectively,
the accountability to shareholders is greatly attenuated. Although it is possible for any
individual to run for a board seat on any company, the publicity and voting costs are
prohibitive. The returns to winning a seat on the board of a very large company are a few
hundred thousand dollars per year, while the costs of mounting a proxy battle run in the
many millions. Even if sensible economically, the chances of winning are trivially small.
A professional service company with a national reputation and the ability to provide all
director functions would be able to increase the gains from winning board seats, while
reducing the per seat cost of winning them. This could create a market for corporate
governance separate and distinct from market for corporate control.
Finally, a BSP may be an effective means of measuring the value of corporate
governance and of those providing director services. 22 For instance, a publicly traded
22

A key problem with many corporate governance reform proposals is that they are empirically
uncertain or contestable, such that we cannot know for sure if requiring, say, more independent directors,
will improve corporate governance outcomes. See, e.g., Roberto Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521 (2005) (collecting over 15 studies on the
issues). This is largely because governance is inexorably tied up with the corporate performance in product,
capital, and labor markets, and therefore the effects of governance are difficult to isolate. We may have a
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BSP providing board services to many firms would have the quality of its services
measured in the market somewhat independently of the operational outcomes of its
clients. Partially decoupling governance and operational performance would allow all
stakeholders to more readily measure the former.
To be sure, there are downsides to providing products and services through
business associations. Risk sharing creates moral hazard problems, and therefore there
may be reduced incentives for individuals providing directors services through a firm to
take care. The moral hazard problem and the potential for risk externalization associated
with limited liability are commonly understood problems of business associations. These
must simply be balanced against the benefits, including the significant potential for the
reputation of large-scale organizations to ameliorate this risk. In addition, there are well
known ways of reducing this risk, including using the piercing the corporate veil doctrine
in extreme cases. Given the broad acceptance and use of corporate forms in other areas of
providing goods and services, we think the cost-benefit tradeoff for corporations serving
as corporate boards is clearly positive in some and perhaps many cases. But our claim is
narrower: we merely argue that firms should be permitted to experiment with having
corporate entities provide some or all of their director services.
To see our idea, imagine a firm, Boards-R-Us, Inc., serving as the board of Acme
Corporation. Instead of Acme shareholders hiring a dozen or so individual sole
proprietors to provide board functions, they instead hire one firm—a BSP—to provide
those functions, whatever they may be. 23 Boards-R-Us would still act through individual
agents, but the responsibility for managing a particular firm, within the meaning of state
corporate law, would be that of Boards-R-Us the entity. This means, for instance, a suit
by shareholders for breach of the board’s fiduciary duties would be against Boards-R-Us,
and not against individuals or groups of individuals.
This Article considers the various details of what this might look like, as well as
sets forth the costs and benefits of the BSP approach compared with the current model.
To see the basics of the BSP model, it is probably helpful to imagine no other change to
governance, that is, holding the current election, function, and liability regimes
constant. 24 All of the current rules of federal and state law, as well as stock exchange
listing standards, governing the nomination and election of directors would continue to
apply. All that would change is that instead of multiple individuals, only a single entity
would be selected. 25

tendency to judge boards as “good” when the firm is performing well, while a “bad” board is likely
associated with bad operational performance. But governance and profitability may be only tenuously
related. For instance, highly profitable firms might need better governance, while poor performing ones
may have quite good governance. We have no good way of currently making this assessment.
23
As discussed in Part II.A, boards fulfill a variety of functions, which vary somewhat from firm
to firm.
24
One of us has elsewhere described U.S. corporate governance as a system of director primacy.
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 547, 605 (2003) (concluding that “the board of directors is not a mere agent of the shareholders,
but rather is a sort of Platonic guardian serving as the nexus of the various contracts making up the
corporation.”). Nothing in our proposal would change that conclusion.
25
Our proposal would not exclude from adopting a approach, with some individual board
members and a board specialist firm providing other services, but we focus on BSPs herein.
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Our proposal is well grounded in state corporate law theory, as well as supported
by analogous cases in which firms serve as boards. Corporate law is generally permissive
about how companies structure their governance, providing merely a set of default rules
that can be altered by contract. 26 Mandatory rules are very rare, and the case for them is
weakened when there are significant benefits, as here, that can flow from freedom of
choice. In addition, there are many cases in which entities, like our imagined BSPs, are
already serving as boards or in board-like capacities. Unincorporated entities, such as
partnerships, LLCs, and the like, are typically permitted to have business associations
serve in the management role played by a corporate board of directors for corporate
entities. 27 In addition, several federal statutes, including the Investment Company Act,
permit directors to be incorporated entities, and the Supreme Court has construed
portions of the securities laws broadly to include corporations acting as directors when
the policy justifications for that result are strong. 28
Our proposal has no ideological or particular substantive corporate governance
valence. The use of BSPs would not necessarily result in more shareholder power or
more managerial power. What it would do, however, is make either of these options more
likely, depending on the other forces at work. If shareholder access to the proxy with the
goal of more competition for board seats is desired, our proposal can achieve this more
directly, at lower cost, and with less downside than the current model. 29 On the other
hand, if what would maximize shareholder value is greater managerial control and a
longer-term view for board decision-making, our proposal could be adapted to this goal
as well. In short, both corporate governance experts like Lucian Bebchuk (shareholder
power) and Martin Lipton (managerial power) should see the value in our proposed board
model. We are trying to reconceptualize the board, not necessarily move it in a particular
direction.
Nothing in our proposal should be read to require a firm to hire another firm to
provide its board services, in whole or in part. 30 We merely question the current regime
in which various laws and regulations effectively forbid firms from hiring BSPs; our
proposal is merely to remove this categorical bar. Imagine if there were a state law
requiring legal services to be provided by individual sole proprietorships. Such a law
might be motivated by a belief that lawyers would be more careful acting alone or that
conflicts of interest arising from pooling legal resources outweigh the gains or some other
reason. But whatever the reason, such a rule would generate widespread opposition from
lawyers arguing that by pooling their resources they could offer better services to their
clients. Clients would object too. While some clients might prefer to hire lawyers
unaffiliated with a large firm, others might prefer the costs and benefits of hiring a firm
instead of a single lawyer. The same is true for corporate governance. It is unlikely that
one size fits all, suggesting that a ban on plausible options must be based on an

26

Delaware, for instance, allows corporations to modify the role of the board of directors,
including not having a board, but mandates that boards consist solely of natural persons. See Part V infra.
27
See Part V infra.
28
See id.
29
See Part VI infra.
30
We say “in part” here because it is possible to imagine individual board members serving along
side a BSP. For instance, inside directors, important investors, representatives of creditors, and even the
government are possibilities. For simplicity, we leave the details of this issue largely to another day.
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overwhelming case. This case has not been made. To the contrary, we think the case for
BSPs is quite strong.
Read in the narrowest sense, our proposal is banal. We are simply advocating
extending the normal presumption of freedom of contract in state corporate law to the
nature of the board. 31 In light of the widespread but largely failed attempts by lawmakers,
courts, and academics to reform board performance through various tweaks of
independence, compensation, fiduciary duties, and so on, we think it is time to encourage
more fundamental experimentation in corporate governance. Our proposal allows this by
freeing firms to rethink and reconceptualize the board. We hope to create a market—the
market for BSPs or the market for corporate governance—that will allow governance to
be priced in more transparent ways.
In this way, our proposal is a half step in the direction of existing mechanisms of
governance that is believed to be superior to the model prevailing in publicly traded firms.
Venture capitalists, private equity funds, and activist hedge funds often have board
representatives, but our proposal differs from what those entities do in important ways.
First, board representation is ancillary to the principal investment activities of such funds.
In contrast, a BSP's principal activity is not investing in corporations but providing
professional board services. To the extent a BSP takes an equity stake in a client, it does
so as compensation rather than as an investment, just as law firms who take an equity
stake in their clients do. The BSP model of governance is about trying to achieve some of
the improved governance benefits of the private equity model without the need for
investors to stake an economic bet on the entire firm. If there develops a robust market
for governance, BSP firms would be a threat to any existing board. The potential for a
takeover of the board function, separate from the takeover of the firm, would be a real
possibility, and with it the possibility that management could be improved by the
intervention of a third party offering a better governance mousetrap. This model could, of
course, be coupled with the board taking a greater stake in the economics of the firm than
it currently has, a possibility that we discuss further below. The use of higher-powered
board incentives would thus create a sliding scale of governance, with the full private
equity model on one end and the current approach on the other. The BSP model would
fall somewhere in between depending on the incentives of the board in any particular
case.
To make our argument that there seem to be sensible reasons why we should
allow, and even encourage, BSPs, this Article considers a series of questions. First, in
Part II, what are current boards of directors supposed to do and how and why do so many
fail to do so? Second, in Part III, what would a BSP model look like? Third, in Part IV,
why might a BSP have advantages, at least for some firms? Fourth, in Part V, what legal
changes are necessary to permit firms to adopt the BSP model? With those questions
answered, in Part VI, we offer some preliminary ideas for extensions, using the debate
about the level of shareholder control of the corporation as a template. We show how
BSPs could be used to achieve either greater shareholder control or greater managerial
control over the corporation, as the firm’s constituencies may prefer. Finally, in Part VII,
31

Although freedom of contract as an organizing principle of corporate law is contested both as a
descriptive and normative matter, we assume it herein without digressing to defend it. For discussion of the
mandatory versus enabling debate, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative
Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 856 (1997).
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we address two objections to our proposal. The first is that limited liability may
undermine proper board functioning by discouraging directors from taking care; the
second is that BSPs are unlikely to arise even if laws preventing them from doing so are
amended. We conclude that while limited liability does not present a significant objection,
there is a significant barrier to adoption arising from transition costs and the fact that our
proposal upsets a variety of vested interests. We are content to leave it to others to figure
out how best to encourage BSPs after we have raised the possibility.
II. The Jobs and Failures of the Current Board of Directors
The Delaware General Corporation Law provides that the corporation’s business
and affairs “shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors,” 32 as do
the corporation statues of almost all other states. 33 Insofar as publicly held corporations
are concerned, however, it has been a long time since anyone believed boards actually
manage corporations on a day-to-day basis. 34 In order to assess the merits of the BSP
model, we therefore need to identify the real world functions performed by modern
boards of directors. We then need to explore why the law assumes that those functions
ought to be performed by a committee of independent contractors.
A. What Do Boards Do?
A modern board’s job has three components: management, oversight, and
service. 35 The balance between them has varied over time and from firm to firm. In recent
decades, the trend has been to elevate the importance of monitoring at the expense of the
others. 36 The question about the optimal mix of these components is orthogonal to our
analysis, since a BSP could be deployed for any and all of them. An exploration of the
board’s current functions is nevertheless an important starting point for our analysis.
1. Management
If one looked solely to corporation statutes for guidance, one would assume that
the board of directors plays a very active role in the corporation’s management. Besides
the general allocation of the conduct of the corporation’s business and affairs to the board,
corporation statutes include many specific mandates that only the board can fulfill.
32
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Approval by the board of directors is a statutory prerequisite, for example, to mergers 37
and related transactions such as sales of all or substantially all corporate assets, 38 the
issuance of stock, 39 distribution of dividends, 40 and amendments to the articles of
incorporation. 41 In addition to those items explicitly assigned by statute to the board,
courts have held that some other decisions are so important that the board of directors
must make them. 42 In some states, such basic matters as filing a lawsuit 43 or executing a
guarantee of another corporation’s debts are extraordinary matters reserved to the
board. 44
Even so, in practice the modern public corporation is too big for the board to
manage on anything resembling a day-to-day basis. In addition, due to the significant
increase in the number of independent directors at public corporations, 45 most board
members today are outsiders who have full-time jobs elsewhere and therefore can devote
relatively little time to the running of the business for which they act as directors. 46 As
early as 1922, the Delaware Chancery Court acknowledged this trend by holding that the
directors’ principal role was one of supervision and control, with the detailed conduct of
the business being a matter that could properly be delegated to subordinate employees. 47
Corporation statutes likewise reflect the reality of modern boards. Section 8.01(b)
of the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), for example, thus provides that the
“business and affairs of the corporation” shall be “managed under the direction of” the
board. 48 This formulation is intended to make clear that the board’s role is to formulate
37
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broad policy and oversee the subordinates who actually conduct the business day-today. 49 The statute also provides that corporate powers may be exercised “under the
[board’s] authority.” 50 This formulation allows the board to delegate virtually all
management functions to senior corporate officers, who in turn of course will delegate
most decisions to subordinate employees. 51
Most boards have taken advantage of these rules to delegate most corporate
decisions to the firm’s top management team. 52 Other than those tasks the law requires be
performed by the board, the modern board’s involvement in management of the firm is
typically limited to hiring and firing the top management team, approving major
transactions, and, perhaps, helping set the broad strategic vision for the firm. 53
2. Service
A diverse board that includes outsiders can provide a number of services to the
top management team. Outsiders can provide access to networks to which insiders do not
belong, thereby assisting the firm in gathering resources and obtaining business. 54
Outside directors affiliated with financial institutions, for example, facilitate the firm’s
access to capital. 55 In addition to simply providing a contact between the firm and the
lender, the financial institution’s representative can use his board membership to protect
the lender’s interests by more closely monitoring the firm than would be possible for an
outsider. In turn, that reduction of risk should result in the lender accepting a lower return
on its loans, thereby reducing the firm’s cost of capital.
An even more important service provided by boards of directors, especially
outside members, is providing advice and counsel to the CEO. 56 By virtue of being
outsiders, the board members can offer the CEO alternative points of view. 57 The multibillion dollar management consulting industry is a testament to the value of this service.
3. Monitoring Managers
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Modern public corporations are characterized by a separation of ownership and
control, which “produces a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate
manager may, and often do, diverge and where many of the checks which formerly
operated to limit the use of power disappear.” 58 Economists Michael Jensen & William
Meckling later formalized this concern by developing the concept of agency costs, 59
which is now widely recognized as “the fundamental concern of corporate law” and
governance. 60
Agency costs arise because a firm’s agents have incentives to shirk. Specifically,
the principal reaps part of the value of hard work by the agent, but the agent receives all
of the value of shirking. In a classic article, economists Armen Alchian and Harold
Demsetz offered the useful example of two workers who jointly lift heavy boxes into a
truck. 61 The marginal productivity of each worker is difficult to measure and their joint
output cannot be separated easily into individual components, which obtaining
information about a team member’s productivity and appropriately rewarding or
punishing it difficult and costly. 62 In the absence of such information, however, the
disutility of labor gives each team member an incentive to shirk because the individual’s
reward is unlikely to be closely related to conscientiousness. 63
Although agents have strong incentives to shirk once they enter into a contract
with the principal, from an ex ante perspective they have strong incentives to agree to
contract terms designed to prevent shirking. 64 Bounded rationality and the potential for
renegotiation, however, preclude firms and agents from entering into the complete
contract necessary to prevent shirking by the latter. 65 Instead, there must be some system
of ex post governance by which firms detect and punish shirking. 66 Accordingly, an
essential economic function of management is monitoring the various inputs into the
team effort: management meters the marginal productivity of each team member and then
takes steps to reduce shirking. 67
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The process just described, of course, raises a new question; namely, who will
monitor the monitors? In any organization, one must have some ultimate monitor who
has sufficient incentives to ensure optimal productivity without himself having to be
monitored. 68 Otherwise, one ends up with a never-ending series of monitors monitoring
lower level monitors. 69 Alchian and Demsetz solved this dilemma by consolidating the
roles of ultimate monitor and residual claimant. 70 According to Alchian and Demsetz, if
the constituent entitled to the firm’s residual income is given final monitoring authority,
he is encouraged to detect and punish shirking by the firm’s other inputs because his
reward will vary exactly with his success as a monitor. 71
Unfortunately, this elegant theory breaks down precisely where it would be most
useful. Because of the separation of ownership and control, it simply does not describe
the modern publicly held corporation. 72 As the corporation’s residual claimants, the
shareholders should act as the firm’s ultimate monitors. But while the law provides
shareholders with some enforcement and electoral rights, these are reserved for fairly
extraordinary situations. 73 In general, shareholders of public corporations lack the legal
right, the practical ability, and the desire to exercise the kind of control necessary for
meaningful monitoring of the corporation’s agents. 74 As a result, the legal system
evolved various adaptive responses to the ineffectiveness of shareholder monitoring,
establishing alternative accountability structures to punish and deter wrongdoing by firm
agents, most notably the board of directors. 75
4. Shifting Priorities
The relative balance between these functions has shifted over time. Survey data
and other forms of fieldwork in the 1970s suggested that boards had a mainly advisory
68
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role. Survey data from the 1990s, by contrast, showed an emphasis on managerial
functions in the sense of broad policy making and setting strategy. By the end of the
1990s, survey data showed that boards were becoming active and independent monitors
of the top management team. 76 What drove this shift?
Although the modern understanding of the board’s role and function has no single
parent, if one were to insist on finding someone to whom to give the bulk of the credit—
or blame—the leading candidate probably would be Professor Melvin Eisenberg. In The
Structure of the Corporation, “perhaps the most important work on corporate law since
Berle and Means’s The Modern Corporation and Private Property,” 77 Eisenberg argued
that boards were essentially passive, with most of their functions captured by senior
executives. 78 According to Eisenberg, the board’s principal remaining function was
selection and supervision of the firm’s chief executive, but most boards failed adequately
to perform even that residual task. 79
As a solution, Eisenberg articulated a corporate governance model that explicitly
separated the task of managing large publicly held corporations from that of monitoring
those who do the managing. 80 In this monitoring model, directors did not undertake
decision making or policymaking, which were assigned to senior management. 81 Instead,
the board’s principal function was to monitor the performance of the company’s senior
executives. 82 Other functions such as advising the CEO, authorizing major corporate
actions, and exercising control over decision making were of minor importance or were
merely pro forma. 83
Eisenberg’s model proved highly influential. It informed the role set out for
boards of directors in the American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance:
Analysis and Recommendations. 84 Aspects of his proposals, such as shifting
responsibility for interacting with the auditor from management to the audit committee,85
have long been incorporated into stock exchange listing standards. 86 As early as the late
1970s, guides to corporate governance best practices had widely adopted the monitoring
model. 87 Indeed, the monitoring model quickly “became conventional wisdom, endorsed
76
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by the Chairman of the SEC, the corporate bar, and even the Business Roundtable.” 88 By
1997, Eisenberg thus was able to declare that “key structural elements of the monitoring
model—including a board that has at least a majority of independent directors, and audit,
nominating, and compensation committees—[were] already well-established.” 89
The monitoring model of the board’s function received further boosts in the major
federal corporate governance laws passed in the wake of the Enron scandal and the
subsequent financial crisis of 2007-2008. In the wake of the former and the concurrent
bursting of the dot-com bubble, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 90 much of
which was intended to require directors to be more effective monitors of corporate
management. 91 The post-financial crisis Dodd-Frank Act 92 likewise “includes significant
governance reforms designed to enhance director oversight of compensation and risk.” 93
B. Contemporary Boards
Boards of directors long have had bad press. In the 18th Century, Adam Smith
famously complained that one could not expect the directors of a joint stock company,
“being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, … should watch
over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery
frequently watch over their own.” 94 Almost two centuries later, William O. Douglas
complained that there were too many boards whose members did “not direct” 95 and
dismissed directors as “business colonels of the honorary type—honorary colonels who
are ornamental in parade but fairly useless in battle.” 96
More recently, the SEC in 2009 complained that the financial crisis had “led
many to raise serious concerns about the accountability and responsiveness of some
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companies and boards of directors ….” 97 In the same time frame, prominent Canadian
corporate governance commentator Stephen Jarislowsky argued that corporate “boards
‘have enormous responsibility for’” for the financial crisis of 2007-2008. 98
Despite this long history of complaints about board performance, there seems
little doubt that the rise of the monitoring model has been accompanied by important
improvements in board behavior. In 1995, only one in eight CEOs was fired or resigned
under board pressure; by 2006, almost a third of CEOs were terminated involuntarily. 99
Over the last several decades, the average CEO tenure has decreased, which also has been
attributed to more active board oversight. 100 In sum, boards of directors, “which once
served largely as rubber stamps for powerful CEOs, have become more independent,
more powerful, and under more pressure to dump leaders who perform poorly.” 101
In addition to the evidence from CEO terminations, other studies confirm a
general improvement in board performance. Studies of post-SOX boards of directors find
that average board size has increased, presumably because companies are adding more
independent directors rather than replacing incumbent insiders. 102 Conversely, the
average number of companies on whose boards a director sits has gone down,
presumably because boards and committees meet more often and have to process more
information. 103
Michael Useem and Andy Zelleke’s survey of governance practices provides
additional evidence for improved board performance. 104 They found that boards of
directors increasingly view delegation of authority to management as properly the subject
of careful and self-conscious decision making. 105 The surveyed board members
acknowledged that they do not run the company on a day-by-day basis, but rather are
seeking to provide stronger oversight and supervision. 106 Increasingly, boards are
establishing written protocols to allocate decision-making rights between the board and
management, although the protocols vary widely, ranging from detailed and
comprehensive to skeletal and limited in scope. 107 Useem and Zelleke conclude that
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executives still set much of the board’s decision-making agenda. 108 At the same time,
they found that boards are increasingly asserting their sovereignty in recent years and that
a norm is emerging among managers that, at the very least, they must be mindful of what
information boards want to hear and what decisions directors believe the board should
make. 109
C. Room for Improvement
While many modern boards demonstrably outperform their predecessors, it would
be Pollyannaish to deny that there is still much room for improvement. The financial
crisis of 2007-2008, for example, revealed widespread board failures in areas such as
enterprise risk management. According to a 2002 survey of corporate directors, 43
percent said that their boards had either an ineffective risk management process or no
process for identifying and managing risk at all. 110 According to the same survey, 36
percent of directors felt they had an incomplete understanding of the risks faced by their
companies. 111
A 2008 Towers Perrin survey of CFOs suggests that risk management remained
underdeveloped when the financial crisis hit. Seventy-two percent of the respondents, for
example, “expressed concern about their own companies’ risk management practices and
ability to meet strategic plans.” 112 Instructively, 42 percent “foresaw more energized
involvement by boards of directors in risk management policies, processes and
systems,” 113 which implies that pre-crisis boards were inadequately engaged with risk
management. This inference finds support in a 2006 observation that risk management
was still “a work in progress at many boards.” 114
Respondents to the Towers Perrin survey pointed to these failures as a root cause
of the financial crisis. Sixty two percent of respondents blamed “poor or lax risk
management at financial institutions as a major contributor to the current financial
mess.” 115 Instructively, surveyed CFOs were more likely to point to risk management
failures by boards as a reason for the financial crisis than either the complexity of
financial instruments or speculation (55% and 57%, respectively). 116
Still another widely asserted criticism is that boards have failed to rein in
allegedly runaway executive compensation. In an influential critique, for example,
Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried argued that “directors have been influenced by
108
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management, sympathetic to executives, insufficiently motivated to bargain over
compensation, or simply ineffectual in overseeing compensation.” 117 As a result, they
claim, executive pay has greatly exceeded the levels that would prevail if directors loyal
to shareholder interests actually bargained with managers at arms’-length. 118 Many other
commentators have leveled similar criticisms at boards. 119
D. Why Boards Fail
The reasons boards continue to struggle include inadequate time, misspent time,
inadequate information, improper skill sets, and insufficient incentives. It is worth
looking at each of these symptoms of director dysfunction in order the stage for our
proposed cure.
1. Time constraints
As the monitoring model came to dominate thinking about the board’s role, the
board’s composition inevitably came to the fore. A board comprised of insiders is poorly
positioned to monitor the CEO. Research on group decision making shows that in mixed
status groups, higher status persons talk more than lower status members. 120 Managers,
for example, talk more than subordinates in business meetings. Such disparities result in
higher status group members being more inclined to propound initiatives and having
greater influence over the group’s ultimate decision. 121 Group dynamics thus help ensure
the CEO’s dominance over inside directors. As a practical matter, moreover, the CEO
typically serves as the chairman of the board, giving the CEO substantial control over
both the selection of new directors and the board’s agenda. 122 Not surprisingly, director
independence therefore is a longstanding goal of corporate reformers, especially those
affiliated with the monitoring model school of thought. 123
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The move towards more “independence” is clear. The NYSE’s listing standards
require all listed companies, other than those with a controlling shareholder, to “have a
majority of independent directors.” 124 In addition, the NYSE has mandated the use of
several board committees comprised of outsiders. 125 The NASDAQ and AMEX have
listing standards similar to those of the NYSE. 126
Under pressure from the stock exchanges and reformers, the percentage of board
members who are independent has risen dramatically. 127 As a result, boards today are
dominated by part timers, the vast majority of whom have full-time employment
elsewhere, which commands the bulk of their attention and provides the bulk of their
pecuniary and psychic income. 128 Historically, moreover, directors did not spend much
time together working as a group. 129 Board meetings were few and short. According to
one survey, for example, during the 1980s directors in large manufacturing companies
averaged a total of 14 board and committee meetings per year, with the average board
meeting lasting only three hours. 130
To be sure, as we have seen, the legislative and regulatory fallout from the
financial crises of the last decade resulted in directors devoting greater time to board
service. Yet, independent directors by their very nature remain part-timers, which has
very real costs:
Independent directors are part time participants in a corporation’s affairs.
By definition they are outsiders. However intelligent, hardworking or
strong minded they may be they do not have the time or the mandate to
challenge management's judgments except as to a discrete number of
issues. If they spend all of their time trying to audit the auditors and assure
that executive compensation is reasonable, they will have no time for
focusing on important business and strategy matters. 131
It appears, moreover, that much of the time directors do spend directing is
misspent. Given that time is a scarce resource—especially for the sort of successful
individuals likely to be tapped for board memberships—this is a potentially serious
problem with contemporary board governance.
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Much of the additional time appears to be devoted to oversight activities, which is
hardly surprising given that both the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts reinforced the
monitoring model’s influence. 132 If so, the additional time and effort being expended by
directors may have important costs. The rise of the monitoring model long has threatened
to generate unproductive adversarial conflict between boards and management. A certain
amount of cognitive tension in the board—top management team relationship is
beneficial to the extent that it promotes the exercise of critical evaluative judgment by the
former. 133 Groups that are too collegial run the risk of submitting to groupthink and
various other decision-making errors. 134 If aggressive monitoring fosters an adversarial
relation between directors and managers, however, this beneficial form of conflict may
transform into more harmful forms. At best, rigid adherence to the monitoring model may
transform a collaborative and collegial relationship into one that is cold and distant.135 At
worst, it can promote adversarial relations that result in destructive interpersonal
conflict. 136 Adversarial relations between two groups tend to encourage each group to
circle the wagons and become defensive vis-à-vis the other, which can encourage zero
sum gamesmanship rather than collaboration and divert energies into unproductive
areas. 137 Unfortunately, as Peter Wallison observes, the “congressional imprimatur”
Sarbanes-Oxley put on the monitoring model has compounded the problem by
encouraging “an adversarial relationship between managements and boards that will, over
time, impair corporate risk-taking and thus economic growth.” 138
Even if a firm’s board and management maintain an appropriately balanced
relationship, the additional time and effort elicited by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may not be
directed productively. Boards today “are more focused on compliance with standards and
regulations than they are on obtaining a competitive advantage.” 139 This leaves boards
with less time to devote to their traditional functions, including management oversight.
2. Directors have an inherent information disadvantage
At the minimum, the presence of outsiders on the board increases decisionmaking costs simply because the process takes longer. Part-time outsiders by definition
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need more information and are likely to take longer to persuade than are full-time
insiders. 140 In addition to having greater access to formal intra-firm information flows by
virtue of being full-timers, insiders have lots of informal contacts within the firm, which
provide even better access to information than are available to outsiders whose
interactions with firm employees is limited. 141 More subtly, and perhaps more
importantly, long-term employees make significant investments in firm-specific human
capital. 142 Any employee who advances to senior management levels necessarily invests
considerable time and effort in learning how to do his job more effectively. Much of this
knowledge will be specific to the firm for which he works, such as when other firms do
not do comparable work or his firm has a unique corporate culture. 143 An employee who
has made significant investments in firm-specific human capital is likely to make better
decisions for the firm than an outsider, even assuming equal levels of information relating
to the decision at hand. The insider can put the decision in a broader context, seeing the
relationships and connections it has to the firm as whole.
3. Directors are generalists
In contrast to insiders, independent directors have little incentive to invest in firmspecific human capital. As noted, they typically have full-time jobs elsewhere and often
serve on multiple boards simultaneously. As a result, they tend to be generalists with little
firm-specific knowledge, skills, or expertise. 144 Modern boards thus tend to be
“composed of individuals who are not qualified to assess the strategic viability of the
corporations they direct.” 145
Corporate casualties in the most recent crisis represent instances of board
members lacking expertise. In years past, some of Merrill Lynch's board
members were leaders of prestigious colleges and universities. However,
nothing would indicate that these individuals had meaningful accounting
or financial expertise. Their backgrounds and lack of corresponding
expertise raise concerns as to their ability to effectively monitor an
investment bank such as Merrill. Similarly, Citigroup has been criticized
for a board that had a dearth of independent directors with a financial
140
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background. Critics have attributed the independent board members' lack
of financial skill as a major contributing factor to the company's
problems. 146
Unfortunately, the rules mandating director independence virtually ensure that this
problem will remain insoluble. The standards defining what constitutes independence
effectively rule out “just about anybody who has firsthand knowledge of the company
and its industry.” 147 While independent directors can develop such knowledge over time,
doing so can be a very lengthy process. 148 Many independent directors thus never
develop more than a “rudimentary understanding of their companies’ workings.” 149
While at least some long serving directors may develop a reasonable knowledge
of the company’s inner workings, long service can give rise to close friendships between
nominally independent directors and the managers with whom they serve. 150 This can
compromise the director’s ability to take strong action when management falters. In some
case, but not all, long serving directors “may find it difficult to be truly independent in
deciding what’s in the shareholders’ best interests.” 151
4. Improper incentives
The most basic way of incentivizing people to do a good job is to pay them for
doing so. 152 Oddly, however, it long was against the law for corporations to compensate
directors at all. 153 Because boards at that time consisted mainly of people associated with
the firm, such as founding entrepreneurs, insiders, or representatives of major
shareholders, their stake in the company provided alternative incentives for good
performance. 154 As independent directors with no such stake in the company became
more common, however, legislatures and courts recognized that compensation now was a
necessary incentive and changed the law to allow it. 155 By the mid-1970s, almost all
public corporations paid their directors, and the amount of director compensation grew
rapidly in the following years. 156
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Unfortunately, the combination of growing cash compensation and management’s
control of the board nomination process acted “to align the interests of the outside
directors with current management rather than with the shareholders…. Directors whose
remuneration is unrelated to corporate performance have little personal incentive to
challenge their management benefactors.” 157 In response, Charles Elson proposed a
radical change in the form of director compensation:
To ensure that directors will examine executive initiatives in the best
interest of the business, the outside directors must become substantial
shareholders. To facilitate this, directors’ fees should be paid primarily in
company stock that is restricted as to resale during their term in office. No
other form of compensation, which serves to compromise their
independence from management, should be permitted. The goal is to
create within each director a personally based motivation to actively
monitor management in the best interest of corporate productivity and to
counteract the oversight-inhibiting environment that management
appointment and cash-based/benefit-laden fees create. 158
In 1996, a NACD blue ribbon panel adopted many of Elson’s ideas,
recommending the use of stock-based compensation and further opining that directors
should personally invest an amount in company stock sufficiently large so as to decouple
the director’s financial interests from those of management. 159 The core idea rapidly
caught on, although few firms went so far as to eliminate all cash compensation and
benefits. According to a 2007 report by the Conference Board, 90 percent of surveyed
companies made some form of stock-based compensation to directors, with 38% paying
all or part of the basic retainer in stock. 160
In theory, this change in board compensation practices should align director
incentives with the interests of shareholders. If directors have skin in the game, their
interests will be more closely aligned with those of the shareholders. The problem is that
the practice of paying directors in stock occurred simultaneously with a dramatic increase
in the use of stock options to pay management. 161 There’s some evidence that stockbased compensation is associated with an increase in managerial manipulation of
financial results. 162
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The incentives of directors with substantial stock holdings or in-the-money
options are more closely aligned with managers than those of shareholders. 163 As a result,
if managers inflate the company’s stock prices by manipulating financial data or
otherwise cooking the books, “directors may go along because they also stand to
benefit.” 164 There is thus an inherent tension between the competing goals of ensuring
director independence and incentivizing them to perform at a high quality level. The
more stock a director owns, the less independent the director becomes. 165
***
With this diagnosis of the symptoms of board failures or shortcomings in hand, in
the next Part, we present a proposed treatment in the form of a new model for providing
corporate board services. We show what a BSP might look like, although a precise
accounting is impossible to make given the numerous degrees of freedom. Only
experimentation in real-world settings is likely to generate answers to the questions about
the optimal type of BSP scope and structure. Our goal therefore is merely to show the
significant potential upside and limited downside of doing away with the natural person
requirement.
III. The Basic BSP Model
In this Part, we briefly sketch out the basics of our proposal for BSPs, that is, that
firms be permitted to provide professional director services to other firms. There are
innumerable permutations for how exactly a BSP would be appointed, function, be held
liable, be removable, and so on, some of which are obvious but many of which are
beyond our capacity to imagine at this point. Our goal in this Article is not to devise the
optimal BSP, assuming such at thing even exists. But rather, consistent with the enabling
nature of state corporate law and the freedom of firms generally to devise their own
approaches to corporate governance, we propose only that firms be permitted to design
their own, tailored, and locally optimal BSP structures. For illustrative purposes, however,
we set forth in this Part what one basic version of the BSP idea might look like. Later, we
explore some possible extensions. Our goal is to create a small legal change—one that is
consistent with the spirit of state corporate law in Delaware and elsewhere—that could
unleash experimentation by firms in improving corporate governance, and thereby
perhaps create an entirely new industry. If our idea takes root, we hope and expect dozens
of BSPs to arise, and the landscape of boards to look much different than it does today
and than we can imagine. The BSPs we expect would develop from our innovation would
be designed to address the sources of current board weakness or failure described in the
prior Part.
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A. The Basic Idea
Instead of a corporate board being comprised of a bunch of individuals acting as
independent contractors, we have in mind a business entity, be it a partnership, LLC,
corporation, or other association, acting as the board of another company. In our model,
the board would be an it, not a group of hes and shes. Instead of nominating and electing
a slate of unrelated individual independent contractors to serve as board members, a BSP
would be chosen to provide director services. 166 Our proposal can thus be distinguished
from merely permitting individual directors to form professional corporations (or some
other limited liability entity) to shield their personal assets from liabilities from their
work as a director. Such a regime would bring only the benefits of reduced director
liability, without any of the other benefits we think arise from having the entire board
function being provided by a single firm.
The best way to understand how the BSP model differs from the current board
model is to compare the differences along the key dimensions of board activity. These
include how directors are appointed, who they are, what functions they serve, how they
make decisions, how they are elected and removed, and what the liability rules governing
there conduct are.
B. Institutional Choices
In the next several Sections, we compare and contrast the generic BSP model with
the current approach. For simplicity, in this Part, we limit this discussion to the simplest
approach. In Part VI below, we offer some extensions and potential areas for
experimentation.
1. Appointment and Elections
The first issue to compare and contrast is how directors get their jobs on the board
in the first place. Under the current approach, a company’s initial board members are
either its incorporators or are named in the corporate charter. 167 Thereafter, shareholders
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vote to elect board members each year. 168 The firm’s shareholders or the shareholders’
agent (e.g., the CEO) nominate individual directors to run for election. For exchangelisted public corporations, the nominating committee of the board of directors is tasked
with selecting new directors and nominating the directors to be elected at the annual
shareholder meeting. 169 Directors so nominated are submitted as a group (known as a
“slate”) to shareholders via the company’s proxy voting materials, but run as individuals.
Because directors generally run unopposed, the shareholder vote is more advisory than
anything else. Indeed, under traditional plurality voting rules a vote of less than 50
percent suggests only shareholder dissatisfaction, because directors with even a single
vote can continue to serve. 170 Of over 17,000 individual directors who stood for election
to publicly traded firms in 2012, 171 only six directors (0.04%) stepped down or resigned
because they did not get shareholder support. 172 Forty-one directors in 2012 lost their
elections (by conventional understanding of the term), and yet remained as directors. 173
The only sure way to remove a director is through a proxy contest, in which a rival pays,
win or lose, the full costs of distributing ballots to shareholders and convincing them to
vote for the rival. Firms pay incumbents’ costs no matter what, and incumbents are
effectively spending shareholders’ money to maintain their jobs.174 Given the asymmetry
of costs and benefits of this strategy, proxy contests are exceedingly rare, and are seen
primarily in cases in which the benefits of winning a board seat include gaining control of
the entire board, and thus the economics of the entire firm. 175 There is no market for
corporate governance, only a market for corporate control.
Most of this process could stay the same with a BSP. The promoters of the firm
would choose a BSP to serve until the first meeting of shareholders, or name the first
BSP in the corporate charter. Once the company goes public, the nominating committee
168
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of the board of directors would take over the process of selecting a BSP to be submitted
to the shareholders for approval. The chosen BSP would serve until the next annual
meeting and could be renominated and reelected indefinitely, as is the case today with
individual directors. Likewise, a BSP would be subject to removal by the shareholders
under the same rules governing removal of individual directors.
But it could be radically different too, either by statutory command, or, preferably,
the choice of individual firms. Other options for the nomination and election procedures,
including ones that could reduce board turnover, thus are discussed below. 176
2. Composition and Function
Another dimension along which we can compare and contrast the current board
model and our proposed alternative is the composition and function of the board. Today,
board members are most commonly current or former CEOs of other companies, as well
as high-profile individuals from business, science, law, academia, accounting, politics,
and other fields. 177 The choice of directors is undoubtedly based on many factors and is
highly situational. For early stage companies, directors with access to key fundraising
connections or with industry expertise may be highly prized, while for later stage
companies, directors with political connections or leadership positions at firms in
complimentary industries might be more valuable. Boards going through a crisis might
need the help of an expert in risk management, someone with government connections, or
someone who has led an organization through a crisis. Other factors, such as personal
relationships and diversity considerations, may also be involved in choosing directors.
Some of these reasons may be desirable from the perspective of shareholders, including
access to lower-cost capital, business connections, political influence, and strategic vision.
Others may not be, including the personal satisfaction of the CEO, in terms of quid pro
quos or rubbing elbows with great figures. 178
Our idea is to do away entirely with having individuals sitting on the board. Just
as a firm outsources much legal work to a law firm rather than a committee of lawyers
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and its external audit function to an accounting firm rather than a committee of CEOs, the
board function would be outsourced to Boards-R-Us and its ilk. To be sure, there would
be individuals serving as the point of contact between the corporation and the BSP, just
as individual partners serve as the contact point between the corporation and its law firm
and auditor. Where the board is called upon to make a decision, such as whether to
approve a merger, the CEO would meet with the contact person at the BSP, who would
then bring the full resources of the BSP to bear on making the decision. The precise
composition of decision-making team within the BSP might vary with the type of
decision at hand, just as law firms put together different teams to handle a given client’s
varying matters. 179
Under the BSP approach, the type of individuals providing board member-like
services could more or less be what they are today or they could be completely different,
depending on how BSP developed over time to meet the needs of their clients. A BSP
could hire the exact mix of individuals that currently serve on corporate boards—current
and former CEOs, politicians, lawyers, and so on. 180 These contractual relationships
could be permanent or temporary, meaning some individuals might have a relationship
with one BSP or for one particular board service contract, while others might offer their
services on a freelance basis. If the current composition of board members is optimal,
there is nothing about our proposal that would upset this. 181 One benefit of the BSP
model, however, is that it would discourage on the margin the hiring of individual board
members as window dressing or because of domination of the board by the CEO. 182
Current boards still all too often include, say the child of a president or famous actor, a
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BSP hired to provide such services is less likely to include such individuals because it has
a profit motive in selecting the best candidates. 183
3. Compensation
Another dimension of comparison is in how directors are compensated for their
work. Directors of large, publicly traded American firm are paid a mix of cash and equity
grants in the corporation. 184 The latter, a relatively recent innovation, are designed to
align the wealth of directors and shareholders so that director incentives are improved
from the perspective of the firm’s residual claimants. 185
In the BSP model, we expect that the BSP would bill client corporations a basic
annual fee for services, just as law firms and external auditors do. Unlike the latter types
of service providers, however, we anticipate that client corporations may wish to pay part
of the BSP’s compensation in equity—such as restricted stock—so as to align the
interests of the BSP with those of the client’s shareholders. 186 Nothing prevents firms
from owning stock in other firms, and the stock holding requirements and restrictions
currently applied to director compensation could be readily transferred to the BSP.
4. Liability
In the BSP model, liability for board misconduct or breaches of fiduciary duty
would reside at the entity level, instead of the individual level. In the event of alleged
director misbehavior, the shareholders of the company would sue the BSP derivatively
for breaches of fiduciary duties. Liability for any violations would be born by the BSP as
an entity, rather than the directors being individually, jointly and severally liable for the
total damages. Entity liability would not preclude individual liability as well under
extraordinary circumstances. As with any case of entities facing liability, individual
agents may also be held liable if there are facts and circumstances suggesting the policy
undergirding the legal rule would be furthered by individual liability.
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IV. Mapping the BSP to the Current Board
As the preceding Part showed, the basic version of our proposal is substantially
similar to the current board model, with the one key difference that the board consists of
an it instead of a collection of individuals. In the next Part, we explain why we think that
small change might have significant advantages, at least for some corporations. To do so,
we map our discussion of BSPs against the analysis and critique of current board
functions lay out an affirmative case for a legal change to permit entities to provide board
services laid out in Part II above. As an organizational matter, however, it turns out to be
advantageous to reverse the order in which we take up the questions of functions and
failures.
A. How BSPs Address the Reasons Current Boards Fail
The advantages of hiring a business association, as opposed to a solo practitioner,
working alone or as part of a larger team, to provide professional services are well known
in other contexts. These include the ability to capitalize on economies of scale and scope,
to share risk, to invest in specialization, and to generate large reputational assets that can
help constrain opportunism. These benefits are the reasons why nearly every other
professional service has the option of being provided by any type of business association.
Lawyers, accountants, compensation consultants, investment bankers, insurance
companies, management consultants, and all other providers of professional services to
firms are free to organize the provision of these services in whatever way they believe is
optimal. There is enormous heterogeneity, and all business association forms, from sole
proprietorships to corporation, are used. The choice varies by firm, by industry, and over
time. Law firms used to be partnerships, but now are largely limited liability companies
or limited liability partnerships. 187 The same is true for investment banks and stock and
commodities exchanges, which also used to be partnerships, but now are predominately
publicly traded corporations. 188 The variation and the dynamic nature of the choices
reflect the fact that the choice of associative forms is responsive to the needs of service
providers and clients, as well as to the background economic and technological
conditions. In other words, the experience of other service industries suggests that
locking in one type of business association as the sole mechanism for providing the
services would have resulted in some serious inefficiency.
Although the benefits of forming various business associations are well known, it
is worth unpacking them to see how they would apply in the context of director services,
since this will demonstrate the appeal of our proposed reform. Specifically, we focus on
the ways a BSP could address the ways current boards fail.
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1. Economies of scale and scope
In Part II, we saw that independent individual board members are part-timers. As
a result, they face three important sets of constraints: limited time, information
asymmetries vis-à-vis management, and a lack of specialist expertise. 189 A significant
advantage of the BSP model is the potential to ameliorate those problems by taking
advantage of the potential economies of scale and scope inherent created when economic
activity is brought within an organization rather than conducted by individuals.
Economies of scale and scope allow firms to increase quality and/or lower cost by
finding efficiencies in production, spreading fixed costs across a larger asset base,
investing in technology, and so on. 190 Economies in the production of goods or services
are common across all areas of the economy. 191 They explain the fact that everything
from the production of consumer products to the delivery of highly specialized services
are provided primarily by large enterprises. 192
Even in highly fragmented professional services industries, like law and
accounting, 193 a substantial part of the industry thus is provided by the largest enterprises.
In legal services, one of the most highly fragmented industries, there are about 180,000
law offices in the U.S., generating nearly $250 billion in revenue. 194 But, according to an
industry report by First Research, over 15 percent of total revenue comes from the largest
50 law firms. 195 For example, Baker & McKenzie, the world’s largest law firm by both
revenue and number of lawyers, has nearly 4000 lawyers who produce over $2 billion in
revenue. 196 The top ten firms worldwide have revenues of nearly $18 billion and employ
over 23,000 lawyers. 197
Economies of scale are most commonly understood in the context of the
manufacture of products. The leading text on organizational theory describes their
benefits observing that a larger manufacturing “firm may be able to afford more
specialized equipment, more distribution outlets located nearer to customers, a larger
number of plants, training programs for its employees tailored to particular circumstances,
and so on.” 198 Although directors do not need more factories or specialized equipment,
any more than lawyers do, the logic of economies of scale readily transfers over to the
provision of professional services. As applied to the problem at hand, the economies of
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scale that a BSP can achieve help redress all three of the problems faced by individual
board members.
a. Time
A large organization providing multi-member teams to carry out the BSP function
inevitably will be able to devote more person-hours to gathering and processing
information and exercising evaluative judgment on the basis of that information than can
an individual, part-time director. Full-time directors would, by definition, be able to
devote more time than part-time ones, and the BSP model provides a mechanism to
create professional directors with no other employment. In addition, a BSP would allow
professionals to leverage support staff to increase the time spent on any matter, all else
being equal. Professional service firms in other areas, like accounting, law, and
consulting, deploy pyramidal structures with multiple levels of full-time professionals,
and this allows them to spend considerable more time on a given project than if a single,
part-time individual were working on the same project alone. In addition, because of the
economies of scale achievable by a BSP, it can do so at a lower cost per person-hour. As
noted above, time, so to speak, can be bought in the market place as well, but the Coasian
efficiency concerns raised above obtain here as well.
b. Information
As just noted, a BSP will be able to devote more time—and, of course, other
resources—to gathering information and at lower cost. In addition, a single BSP wielding
the full powers of the board may be in a better position to demand forthrightness by the
top management team than would a single, lone wolf director acting alone. Even a
subgroup of individual directors acting in concert would have less bargaining power visà-vis top management than a BSP acting as the entire board. Although the information
asymmetry between a top management team and the BSP could never be fully eliminated,
just as there are persistent information asymmetries between top management and the
firm’s outside lawyers and accountants, 199 we would expect BSPs to have better access to
information than do individual directors. Not only is the BSP likely to have better
information about the firm it is serving, it will also have much more information about
the particular questions it is considering, whether they are about compensation, strategy,
finance, or the like. As we consider next, BSPs will enable much greater general
knowledge and information to be brought to bear on firm decisions and at much lower
cost.
c. Specialization
In addition to firm-specific information, board members need general human
capital in various areas of knowledge and expertise. A board thus may benefit from
199
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members with experience in finance, international business, government and regulation,
risk management, marketing, social media, and the companies’ specific industries, not to
mention the inclusion of minorities and women. 200 Even if a board were to include
individuals with all of these skills, however, any reasonably sized board will necessarily
be under-inclusive of the skills and experience needed to address all of the issues that
may arise. In addition, the ideal mix of board expertise is likely to vary over time or even
from decision to decision. Directors serve for long periods—the average tenure for
directors of S&P 500 firms in 2012 was nearly nine years 201 —and are generally not
replaced during any individual year to address particular issues. This means the current
board model is likely to be far lumpier than the expertise needed for any particular issue
on any particular day.
As noted above, an obvious solution to these limitations is for a board to buy the
expertise needed at a particular time instead of seeking it internally. This has been and
largely remains the practice. Most obviously, management provides much of the
information, analysis, and expertise the board needs to make decisions. Unfortunately, of
course, this dependence on management is one of the key factors that undermines current
boards’ ability to function as independent decision-making bodies, especially because
forthrightness from management may be least likely precisely when the board’s oversight
is needed most.
In addition, external consultants of various sorts provide the board with advice or
information. Compensation consultants are routinely hired to advise the compensation
committee; headhunters advise nomination committees; audit firms help audit
committees; and so on. The independence of such advisors, however, was questionable
because management traditionally hired them. There are thus two problems with the
current model—efficiency and conflict of interest.
At least with respect to the audit and compensation functions, federal law now
seeks to ameliorate the conflict of interest problem. Federal law now requires reporting
companies to have a compensation committee comprised exclusively of independent
directors and provides that that committee shall have exclusive authority to hire, fire, and
compensate compensation consultants. 202 The same statute further requires the SEC to
promulgate rules designed to ensure that compensation consultants are independent of
management. 203 Likewise, federal law requires reporting companies to have an audit
committee comprised exclusively of independent directors. 204 The audit committee must
have exclusive power to hire, fire, and compensate the firm’s external auditors. 205 There
is doubt these new rules have solved the conflict-of-interest problems in these areas
because of continued management control and influence. Even assuming that these
developments have solved the conflicts of interest that long plagued the consultantcorporate client relationship in those areas, conflict-of-interest problems persist outside of
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those contexts. Boards remain dependent on management and outside advisors selected
by management for much of the information they need. Even if one believes, however,
that firms are now at the optimal equilibrium in the build-versus-buy decision for board
expertise along this dimension, efficiency considerations remain.
The problem is one identified by Ronald Coase in his work on the theory of the
firm. 206 As Coase explained when describing why firms exist in the first place, there are
significant gains from bringing functions or services bought in the market inside of a
given firm. 207 Buying services or information in the market involves numerous costs,
including search costs, bargaining costs, transaction costs, monitoring costs, enforcement
costs, and so on. Ringing the boundaries of a firm around these functions or services can
reduce these costs by virtue of the reduced costs of the fiat allocation system, but at some
point in size these gains are swamped by the costs of bureaucracy. 208 Coase’s insight was
that firms should be the size where the marginal gain from the addition of another
individual or function is equal to the costs of that addition in terms of optimal decision
making. 209 It is difficult to imagine that the optimal Coasian firm for provision of director
services is comprised of a single individual in all cases, just as it is not for legal or
consulting services. As such, potential efficiencies in the operation of boards could be
realized by removing the statutory constriction on the Coasian firm.
For instance, associating with other professionals allows individuals to develop
and invest in specialized knowledge and expertise. Service professionals are routinely
organized as business associations comprised of managers 210 who have decision-making
authority and who supervise other professionals who provide support services. The
typical law firm or consultancy fits this model. The pyramidal structure of such firms
allows professionals to become experts in particular areas, and then to be deployed as
needed as part of a team. Consider a typical management-consulting firm. These firms
deploy experts with particular skills or knowledge of different industries or fields,
technical experts in certain areas (e.g., econometrics, finance, and so forth), lawyers,
accountants, scientists, psychologists, and countless other professionals, as well as
generalist consultants. Just as directors currently are required by law to buy all of their
support services, either from the company they serve or from the market, one could
imagine consultants or lawyers or accounts being required to do so as well. But the
Coasian equilibrium for these professional services firms are larger than one person firms,
and we expect the same is true of directors.
To see how this might translate into the market for BSPs imagine a BSP vertically
integrating with some or all of the experts that currently provide board members with
information and advice. In the pure BSP model, one or more of the BSP’s senior
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managers act as liaison between the BSP and client, just as a lead law firm or accounting
partner often acts as the primary liaison between such firms and their clients.
Alternatively, the individuals currently serving the client as directors could be hired by
the BSP and thereafter continue functioning as the client’s board. In either case, the BSP
would be a large firm that vertically integrates the BSP function with all board advisory
services, excepting law and accounting, such compensation consultants, management
consultants, and others serving in support roles. The economies of scale and scope
described above would allow the partners in this model to have board service as their
full-time occupation. 211 The result would likely be not only an improvement in the
quality and incentives of directors (or those now serving in that role) but also in the
creation of a new profession, that of professional director. Professions, as such, are
thought to be valuable because they develop codes of conduct and engage in selfregulation to encourage profession-specific reputation. 212
Our proposal for BSPs is thus a potential mechanism for achieving Ronald Gilson
and Reiner Kraakman’s dream of professional directors. 213 In “Reinventing the Outside
Director,” they proposed creating a class of professional directors who will serve on a
portfolio of boards as their full-time job. 214 These professionals would know their
portfolio companies better, because they will be able to devote more time to following
those companies, and they will be more dependent on institutional shareholders for their
position. 215 They recommend the use of a central clearinghouse to take care of the
logistics of helping institutional shareholders select professional directors to serve on
their companies' boards. 216 The Gilson and Kraakman proposal went nowhere, perhaps
because the idea of turning over the governance of a company to a clearinghouse was a
step too far for corporate managers. Our proposal for BSPs is a more modest step, in that
it could achieve the same goal but within the current power structure of firms. Yet we can
imagine this simple change leading to a new profession, just as envisioned by Gilson and
Kraakman.
2. Incentives
In this Section, we consider a variety of ways in which the BSP model could
provide improved incentives that would help ameliorate some of the dysfunctions of the
211
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current board model. Although directors are well paid for the work they do, their
monetary incentives to work hard and do well are fairly limited, since they capture so
little of any gains and suffer so little any of the losses from the decisions they make. In
light of this fact, reputation plays an important role in the incentive calculus. But, as
discussed above, the reputational gains and losses are also highly attenuated from
performance. This creates the possibility of large welfare gains from improved incentives
for directors.
a. Compensation incentives
Large, publicly held corporations generally pay directors a few hundred thousand
dollars annually for their work, and require directors to hold a fairly trivial amount of the
corporation’s stock. 217 Microsoft Corporation is typical of very large, publicly held
corporations. In 2011, Microsoft had a ten-member board, and each director was paid
$100,000 in cash, and granted stock worth $150,000. 218 This mix of cash and stock is
designed to give board members a stake in the outcome of their decisions, while
compensating them for the time they spend preparing for and in board meetings.
Although the stock-holding requirement undoubtedly gives board members some
incentives to care about firm value, the amounts are routinely so small that critics believe
they do little to optimally align shareholder and board incentives. 219
Under the BSP approach, compensation may look much as it does today or could
be quite different. 220 For instance, if a BSP assigns a number of individuals to serve as
permanent board members, the firm might simply replicate the current pay structure of
the underlying client company, paying a fixed salary (equal to the company’s current
annual retainer) and requiring individual employees of the BSP to hold equity in the
client, as in the Microsoft example. If instead the BSP deployed a variety of professionals
to a particular client depending on the situational needs, then one might expect the stock
in the client to be held at the BSP level, and the payment to board members to be based
on an algorithm tied to individual performance as a director for one or more firms. If the
BSP and client opted for the full BSP model, with one or two liaison managers
interfacing between client and BSP and the BSP itself serving as the board, we would
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expect compensation structures with such BSPs to resemble those of other
consultancies. 221
But there are some possibilities for innovation that could improve the incentives
of board service providers. One option would be for the BSP to take a much larger stake
in the client company. A greater ownership stake by the board has the potential to
improve incentive alignment, but there are two barriers to this. The first is that giving
boards large upside stakes with limited downside risks skewing decision making in a
socially undesirable fashion. The potential solution to this is discussed below. The second
is that individual, part-time board members are not well positioned to bear this kind of
risk and their work does not routinely justify such large stakes. Hiring a BSP could help
address these concerns. Because of risk pooling, greater reputational stakes, greater
efficiency, and so on, a BSP could hold a much larger stake in its client than the sum of
the stakes held by individual board members.
This prospect raises a potential analogy to the private-equity model of governance.
One of the chief virtues of the private equity industry is that it consolidates the ownership
interests of the firm, and thus helps undo the harms that flow from the separation of
ownership and control. 222 Managers of private-equity-owned firms have a tremendous
economic stake in the success of these firms, and therefore, it is thought, better incentives
to take care and make good decisions. 223 A downside, however, is that the improved
governance only obtains when the entire firm is taken over, and the public shareholders
are displaced. A market for corporate governance could be a half step in this direction,
since we could see BSPs taking a larger stake in the client company than current board
members but without having to take over the entire company. BSPs could bear more risk
than individual directors, and would be likely be willing to and have an interest in greater
economic ownership than the current, rather low levels of current board ownership. For
instance, Microsoft’s directors are required to hold stock equivalent to three times their
board service fee of $100,000. As of April 2013, this means the board was required to
hold about 0.001% of the value of shares of Microsoft. 224 Accordingly, even if a BSP
took just a 1 percent stake in its client, on top of any service fees, this would amount to a
thousand-fold increase in incentive alignment of Microsoft’s board.
We could go further, and expect BSPs to do so as the market evolves and the
initial design and conflict issues are resolved, in the direction of giving BSPs greater
stakes to the residual corporate claims. One possibility would be for companies to hold an
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auction for board services on a periodic basis (e.g., annually or biennially) in which rival
BSPs would compete to win the work. In an auction model, the company looking to hire
a BSP would write a board-services contract specifying the financial and other terms of
the deal. For instance, the company might offer the winner of the auction a portion of the
residual claim on the firm’s assets, such as a guaranteed dividend or number of shares.
BSPs would then submit bids for the minimum amount of dividend or shares they would
take in order to perform the work. This would have the dual virtues of giving BSPs
greater incentives to perform by making them hold residual claims on firm value, and
making BSPs compete in a transparent way for the board role.
Another potential change to the compensation structure was alluded to above in
the discussion of vertical integration of the board services industry. Firms pay a lot more
for board services than simply the cash and stock issued to directors. Firms buy directors
insurance, self-insure for certain claims against directors, and, as noted above, hire
various consultants, accountants, lawyers, and other experts to assist the board in
fulfilling its duties. Consider again the case of Microsoft. For a company of Microsoft’s
size and industry, D&O insurance costs about $4 million or about $400,000 per
director. 225 In addition, Microsoft’s corporate charter, like most firms, contains a
provision indemnifying directors against breaches of the duty of care. This self-insurance
is difficult to quantify, but is likely a significant cost as well. In addition, boards routinely
hire experts of various kinds, including management and compensation consultants, law
firms, and other service providers. While there are no good estimates of these costs, there
is reason to believe they are in the range of several million dollars per firm per year. All
told, for example, Microsoft pays at least $2.5 million for board services, plus a minimum
of several million more in insurance costs and other services, making the total costs of
director services nearly $10 million per year. 226 If Microsoft’s costs are typical, this
means the director services market—for just the Fortune 500 firms—is a $3 to $4 billion
per year industry. Costs for smaller firms likely are lower, but given that there are about
15,000 publicly traded firms in the U.S., if the average publicly traded firm has just $1to
$2 million in direct and indirect director costs, there is the potential for $15 to $30 billion
per year BSP industry.
That this huge industry is delivered entirely through the actions of a group of parttime, sole proprietors is surprising. As noted above, there are likely significant gains to be
had from industry consolidation across the supply chain. This could mean that BSPs
would house some combination of decision making, insurance, and support in one
corporate body. In terms of compensation, the payment for board services could reflect
this combination of services with BSPs bidding on multi-million dollar contracts. There
are a few potential positive effects of this. First, the significant size of these payments
would likely be sufficient to justify the creation of BSPs and to generate competition
amongst them for a given board service contract. The vertical integration would help
create a vibrant market for corporate governance by raising the stakes of taking over the
board. Second, this model would increase the transparency of board costs for
shareholders, who currently do not have good information on the total costs of boards.
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Third, the introduction of potentially more efficient competitors in this space may have
the effect of driving down board costs, while holding constant or improving corporate
governance.
b. Liability-based incentives
We think the use of BSPs may also have salutary effects on the quality of
corporate governance through improved judicial supervision of board activities. Courts
may be more willing to hold BSPs liable than individual directors, and this could help
make fiduciary duties more robust. The logic is straightforward. As noted above,
directors are independent, amateurs without deep pockets, but who face enormous
potential liability for the decisions they make. For instance, the sloppy approval of a
merger could subject directors, including individual directors to multi-million dollar
liability, not to mention the significant risk to their personal reputation. Courts seem
reluctant to impose liability on directors, 227 and perhaps increasingly so in recent
years. 228 This could be because of institutional competency concerns, worries about
hindsight bias, the potential chilling effect on risk taking, the reluctance to hold
individuals (some of whom are not super rich) liable for potentially huge damage awards,
and the potential impact of increased liability on the supply of individuals willing to
provide director services. Whatever the reasons, if directors form associations to share
risk, this reduces the potential negative cost on individuals, and thereby may increase the
willingness of courts to impose liability.
To see the point, consider the impact that the availability of directors and officers
insurance (D&O insurance) has on judicial enforcement of board duties. In the absence of
any insurance, courts would be significantly less likely to find individual board members
liable for breach of their fiduciary duties. In this way, third-party insurance can, at least in
theory, be a mechanism for enhancing compliance with law. 229 Sharing risk (in this case
through insurance contracts) reduces the costs of liability for individual directors, and
therefore may make a finding of liability more likely, all else being equal. The downside
of insurance—the moral hazard or shirking problem—can be reduced through monitoring
(both ex ante and ex post) and some risk bearing, in the form of deductibles or the like.
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Self-insurance in the form of organizational choice is simply an extension of this
idea to areas of liability beyond those currently covered by contractual insurance.
Directors who are able to pool their risk through a business form we call the BSP can
reduce their risk. The ability to share, and thus reduce, risk is one of the most powerful
reasons for forming a business association. A single individual running a business faces
all of the risk if the business fails or generates liabilities that exceed its assets. If all
businesses were required by statute to be run by an individual acting as a sole proprietor,
risk alone would work a serious impediment to the provision of all sorts of products and
services. By forming a business association in which risk is shared among various owners,
the business can take on more risk than could and would a sole proprietor. 230 This is
because some individuals will have greater risk tolerances than others, and these may not
line up with other attributes that can be brought to use by a firm. 231
The additional liability in such cases would be doing work primarily in cases in
which potential damages exceed liability coverage, since this is the extensive margin
where courts are most likely to feel whatever pressure they feel to take it easy on
misbehaving directors. The existence of insurance for breaches of certain fiduciary duties
already reduces the downside for directors, and therefore makes judicial supervision more
robust than it would likely be in the absence of insurance. The additional risk reduction
from operating as a business association would therefore act mostly in those cases in
which the expected liability exceeds the insurance coverage. This could either be for
large damage awards or for certain actions, such as breaches of the duty of loyalty.
The risk-sharing of organizational choice may also do some work in cases in
which the conduct is completely covered by insurance. There is reason to believe that the
D&O insurance market does not work optimally, 232 and adding self-insurance or replace
the D&O model with self-insurance could help make corporate liability more effective.
While one would expect insurance costs to discipline firms, it is not obvious this
translates readily into the market for director talent, since liability is so rare, is not often
linked with necessarily bad behavior, and, in any event, the labor market for directors is
thought to be so dysfunctional. Directors do not feel the liability personally, except in the
rarest and most extreme circumstances, and there is some evidence that directors’
reputations, which we expect to do most of the discipline, are not highly correlated with
past performance. There is also some evidence that insurance prices do not obviously
respond to incidents of director liability. Bringing the insurance function within the firm
providing the service (either through vertical integration of the D&O function or simply
through risk-pooling inherent in providing services through firms) may improve the
pricing of risk and the judicial treatment of defendants.
Not only might the BSP model make courts less reluctant to impose fiduciary
duties on boards, but the corporate model for boards is also likely to generate more
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fiduciary duty litigation. Every allegation of serious board misconduct is likely to result
in multiple suits: one by the company against the BSP and one by the shareholders of the
BSP against the directors of that firm. The addition of the second type of suit could work
as an additional deterrent to board misconduct, malfeasance, or gross negligence. Of
course, if one believes that the current amount of litigation is optimal (or even excessive)
because directors face the perfect incentives to behave well, then additional liability may
add costs in excess of the benefits.
c. Reputational incentives
Another benefit of our model is that it will increase the reputational stakes of
every board decision, meaning more incentive for good work, all else being equal.
Reputation is already an important element of the corporate governance regime.
Harnessing the reputation of directors to prevent cheating and shirking is a vital element
of effective corporate governance. 233 Lawsuits, whether settled or reduced to judgment,
alleging disloyalty or insufficient care by directors can harm directors’ reputations. 234
This can cost directors their position on the board in question or seats on other boards
either now or in the future. Since directorships are lucrative for little work, and one well
done usually leads to another, 235 a director’s reputation could be worth several hundred
thousand dollars per year or more. In addition, lawsuits may result in more general losses
to directors’ reputation in their other endeavors, be it business, law, academia, politics, or
other fields. Modern corporate boards often have directors who have made large
investments in their reputation, and these directors can be expected to act in ways to
minimize the collateral damage from misbehaving as a director. 236 For instance, the
Enron board famously included the former dean of the Stanford business school, three
CEOs of other companies, political luminaries from the UK, and the former head of the
M.D. Anderson Cancer Center. 237 These are important positions that these directors
worked very hard to achieve, which adds to the reputational hit for director
wrongdoing. 238
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Some scholars believe reputation is the most important constraint on director
behavior, and that it alone can induce efficient board conduct. 239 Others, pointing to
failures by boards filled with individuals with seemingly valuable reputations, note that
the evidence suggests reputation is not doing all the work necessary to ensure good
governance. 240 Of course, the existence of some corporate failures does not mean
directors are engaging in suboptimal care levels or that reputation is not sufficient; the
optimal level of governance failure is not obviously zero.
But we need not resolve this debate to demonstrate the value of BSPs. This is
because reputation and legal sanctions are complementary mechanisms for policing
corporate decision-making, and as noted above, there is reason to believe legal sanctions
are likely ineffective at inducing the optimal actions by directors. The business judgment
rule may be the optimal rule, but it surely lets some sloppy and self-serving transactions
happen without scrutiny. Accordingly, the more work that reputational sanctions can do,
the less work that law needs to do or the less we need to worry about judicial
enforcement of director duties. From the current baseline of whatever work reputation is
doing, greater reputational stakes can only improve governance, especially since it can
relieve pressure on courts to policy corporate decisions.
In theory, the size of reputation, and therefore the work done by reputational
assets in disciplining behavior, is correlated with the number of individuals whose
reputation is influenced by a particular decision. This is because for associations
providing services, “the reputation of the entire firm is at stake whenever a single
[service] is sold.” 241 If an individual makes a decision, then only the individual’s
reputation is at stake; if a firm of 100 individuals makes the same decision, the reputation
of the entire firm is at stake. If each of the individuals has the same amount of reputation,
the stakes are 100 times greater in the case of a firm making the decision. Of course, the
full reputation of each person in a large organization may not be reduced in the event of a
failure, but the net impact of reputational losses is likely increasing in the number of
individuals comprising the decision-making entity. 242 Therefore, a significant advantage
of creating large business associations to provide services is that they can generate
greater reputational assets than the sum of the individual reputations at stake for a given
transaction.
The greater reputation at stake for a given transaction means higher quality
services. Reputation is a way of bonding the quality of a product or service, and for a
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given level of legal scrutiny, the greater the firm’s reputation, the more likely the product
or service will be of high quality. The bonding theory of reputation holds that “[t]he more
[services] sold, all things equal, the more valuable is a reputation for high quality, and
thus the stronger is the reputational bond to provide high quality.” 243 Therefore, as a
matter of reputation theory, there is reason to believe BSPs will be able to provide higher
quality services than individual board members acting as a group of sole proprietors.
Associations of individuals can better commit to quality than individuals acting alone or
as a loosely affiliated group. 244
Larry Ribstein applied this bonding argument to the law firm setting, which is
closely analogous to the director services model we propose. 245 Ribstein argued there was
a strong relation between reputation and the size of a professional services firm: the
larger the firm, the greater the cost of reputational losses, and therefore the stronger
commitment to quality. 246 Applying the insight of Ronald Coase, Ribstein notes, however,
that increasing size also adds organizational costs, and accordingly professional services
firms will increase the number of professionals until the point where the marginal cost of
monitoring an additional professional for quality equals the reputational gain from adding
the professional. 247 It is highly unlikely that this equilibrium point is a single professional,
as state corporate law rules require for director services provision.
In a recent paper, Ed Iacobucci extends Ribstein’s work, pointing out some
additional downsides of size. Although Iacobbuci starts from the position that business
associations “are better able to commit to providing high quality for reputational reasons
than sole proprietors,” 248 he notes that size has an additional cost beyond monitoring—
large size “increases the short-run profits from sacrificing reputation and providing lowquality service” in an individual case. 249 For large firms, the negative effects from
cheating fall on a per service basis as the size of the firm grows. In addition, the
transparency of cheating is reduced across a very large firm, as clients in one part of the
world may not learn about poor performance in another part of the world, as they would
for much smaller firms. 250 Iacobucci resolves this tradeoff by providing conditions in
which the reputational gains from scale outweigh the potential for reputational
opportunism. For instance, the long-term gains are greater than the short-term
opportunism where services are provided nonsimultaneously, such that each sale risks the
reputation of the entire firm, but the gains from cheating are limited to a single product or
243
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service. 251 Giving partners in the association an equal stake the outcome also ameliorates
the potential risk of short-termism. Applying this model to professional service firms, in
his case law firms, Iacobucci concludes “[t]o the extent that the firm adopts profit
sharing, a partner’s incentives to provide low quality are weaker than a sole proprietor’s.
This in turn makes a larger firm, all things equal, better able to commit to maintaining a
reputation for high-quality legal service.” 252
The conclusion that size leads to higher quality because of investments in
reputation is supported by empirical evidence in the case of law firms. Profits per partner,
a standard measure of law firm quality, are generally higher for larger law firms. 253
Larger law firms also perform better along other metrics of quality. For instance, Marc
Galanter and Bill Henderson find that ethical violations are more common for sole
proprietors and small firms than for larger law firms. 254 Other work by Henderson finds
more equal sharing of profits by more prestigious law firms, which is consistent with
Iacobucci’s claim about profit sharing being an important check on opportunism. 255 As
Iacobucci concludes, all of these “findings are consistent with larger law firms having
better reputations, and thus consistent with the theory” about reputation increasing in firm
size, but subject to limits that can be reduced through incentive structures.
The theory of reputations, subject to the caveats provided by Ribstein and
Iacobucci, is as applicable to the provision of board services as it is to the provision of
legal, accounting, or consulting services. One can easily imagine a BSP of similar size to
the large professional services firms in these other industries. As noted above, the size of
the director industry is as many as 15,000 or more firms spending tens of billions of
dollars per year on hiring, insuring, and otherwise supporting directors. 256 If even ten
percent of those firms switched to a BSP, one could imagine an industry arising with
numerous large BSPs each employing hundreds or thousands of professionals serving as
corporate decision makers and support staff. This is not even considering the other
industries that are related to director service or provide services to directors that could
easily be integrated into a larger BSP. For instance, companies or their boards routinely
hire consultants or experts in tax, compliance, internal controls, auditing, strategy, and
other areas. Many of these are billion dollar industries, and BSPs could theoretically
provide some or all of these directly, either directly or indirectly. In short, the potential
for the creation of large, multi-billion dollar firms with significant reputational assets is
not far fetched. BSPs with numerous professionals, serving as directors, researchers,
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experts of various kinds, and so forth, would have a large reputation at stake in each
transaction, and this would lead to higher quality services, all else being equal. 257
d. Exposure to market forces
Effective corporate governance depends on ensuring directors are accountable for
corporate decisions. This is done through several mechanisms, some internal to and some
external to the company. Businesses use incentive contracts and the power to reappoint
directors, as well as reputational sanctions and legal liability.
A related benefit of the BSP model is that BSPs would be more accountable than
the group of individuals currently providing board services; indeed, we believe that the
accountability of the whole would be greater than the sum of the liabilities of the parts.
We have already identified a variety of ways in which the BSP model will likely increase
accountability: reducing the impact of personal liability through risk pooling, and thus
increasing the robustness of fiduciary duties; providing a second-order accountability
regime through the threat of suits by two distinct sets of corporate owners (i.e., both the
owners allegedly mistreated by the BSP, and the owners of the BSP); and increasing the
reputation at stake in each transaction. Beyond these, however, there is at least one
additional way in which BSPs are likely to be more accountable for bad performance than
individual directors.
Currently, there is a mismatch between decision-making authority and the
mechanisms of accountability. Although board members vote individually on all
corporate decisions, their actions are made and recorded as a group. This has the potential
to undermine the efficiency of the market for corporate directors. The votes of an
individual director are not made public, and therefore the ability of shareholders or other
corporate observers to hold directors to account for their decisions is limited. Directors
may get reputations in the limited market for director talent, but information is extremely
limited, and the incentives of decision makers (e.g., CEOs) may be misaligned with those
of shareholders. It is in part for this reason that critics have pointed out that the market for
independent directors is not well functioning. Professors Gilson and Kraakman describe
that the argument that the choice of outside directors is disciplined by market forces as a
“myth” akin to a belief in “directorial noblesse oblige.” 258 There is effectively no robust
market for board seats based on externally measured performance. This means that
internal metrics, like the CEOs’ preferences, will be determinative of who sits on the
board.
There is some evidence suggesting the market for directors is not functioning as
robustly as possible. Professors Steve Kaplan and David Reishus examined whether the
performance of CEOs influences their ability to earn and retain seats on the boards of
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other companies. 259 They found CEOs of companies with large dividend cuts (as a proxy
for poor performance) are less likely to serve on the boards of other companies, although
they cannot distinguish between a theory of labor market constraint and a theory of
choice by managers to spend more time on their own firms. 260 Importantly, however, they
find that while negative performance is correlated with serving on fewer boards, it does
not result in board members losing their current board seats very often. The data show
that over 80 percent of directors who are CEOs of poorly performing firms retain their
board seats at other firms four years after the poor performance. 261 This data led
observers to note that the director market, as it may exist, is “quite ineffective.” 262
The use of BSPs has the possibility to improve accountability by identifying a
single entity as the decision maker, and by creating a more robust market for board
services. Rival board-service firms will likely compete for the work, creating a
competitive market for governance that exists outside of and beneath the market for
corporate control. As discussed in Part TBA below, for example, BSPs could offer their
services to shareholders in a competitive election. If a BSP is providing directors services
to Acme, and rival Board Services Inc. believes it can do the work better or at lower cost,
it could bid for the work, either by convincing the individual responsible for nominations
of its superiority or by going directly to shareholders in a proxy contest.
Importantly, rival BSPs might have the financial incentive to do so in ways that
individual directors currently do not. Currently, individual directors run as a slate, and
any competition for individual places on the board happens behind the scenes, through
networks, head hunters, building relations with management, and so on. This state of
affairs has been criticized as leading to too much deference to management, since board
members only get seats by pleasing the choosers. 263 The competition does not happen in
the open because it is not feasible or cost effective for an individual board member or
group of board members to run as a rival slate or for a particular seat in a proxy battle.
Although it is theoretically possible for an individual wanting to serve on the board of
Acme, Inc. to communicate with all the shareholders of Acme urging them to vote to put
that person on the board, the cost of identifying the shareholders, convincing them to
support the candidate, and then obtaining and voting their proxies would be prohibitively
expensive. This is why the current model of board service generates competition only
when votes for board members are linked to an economic stake in the firm. Running for a
board seat or seats makes sense only when the economic gains from taking over the firm,
and thereby having a claim on operational profits, generate sufficient benefits to offset
the (large costs) of a proxy vote. In other words, the market for board seats is inexorably
tied to the market for economic control of the firm.
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The BSP approach would delink these to a certain extent. The BSP model would
reduce the costs of multiple board members coordinating to take control of a board, and
would perhaps lower the costs of providing board services sufficiently to make it
economically feasible to win a board election without needing an economic stake in the
firm. Large BSPs could have economies of scale and a brand that would lower the costs
of communicating their value to shareholders. It isn’t difficult to imagine a BSP
becoming sufficiently well known, like a prominent law firm, auditing, or consulting firm,
such that the costs of communicating with and persuading shareholders would be
dramatically lower than for individual board members. If Boards-R-Us is the incumbent
BSP, and Board Services Inc. believes it can perform board services more efficiently
(that is, better governance for the same cost or the same governance at lower cost), then it
could inform shareholders of its intention to run for the job and stand for election at the
annual meeting.
Our approach would create market competition, in a sense, for board services
without the need to change the economic structure or ownership composition of the
company. So, if Boards-R-Us is the incumbent board, and Board Services Inc. displaces
it in a shareholder election, this would not have any impact on the underlying ownership
of Acme’s shares. It would be similar to Acme changing its accountants from KPMG to
Ernst & Young. Although board members control the corporation in ways that
accountants do not, this does not necessarily turn a contested board election into a battle
for control of the firm in the way we think of what is at stake in today’s market for
corporate control. Today, because board elections are not competitive in the absence of
an economic stake giving voting control to a corporate raider, changing the board and
controlling the economic fate for the corporation are inexorably linked. In other words, if
one wants economic control of the corporation, one takes a large enough economic stake
to be able to control the election of the board. But in our imagined world, board elections
would be competitive, even in the absence of insurgents taking large equity stakes in the
firm. Board services would be awarded based on a majority (or super-majority or
whatever voting rule the firm thinks makes the most sense) vote of the shareholders.
Then, once board members (or, in this case, a BSP) are elected, they owe fiduciary duties
to the firm’s shareholders, and this would be true regardless of the associative type of the
board.
e. Measurability
Another benefit of using a BSP is that it may make measuring board governance
quality more straightforward. A significant problem in reaching the goal of improved
corporate governance is our ability to measure governance quality at particular firms.
This is because “governance” is not something that can be measured precisely in the
abstract, since it is conflated with operational performance. Firms are valued based on
their operational performance, that is, their ability to generate cash, not on whether they
have “good” or “bad” governance. Although governance and performance might be
correlated in some cases, this is not necessarily the case; some good performing firms
could improve their governance, and some bad performing firms undoubtedly have great
governance.
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Shareholders, academics, and other corporate observers try to measure
governance in a variety of ways, all of which have limitations. First, we can attempt to
measure the quality of firm governance or a particular governance change (e.g., the
appointment of a board member or the declassification of a board) by estimating the
impact of the announced change on the firm’s overall value. The use of event studies is a
widely accepted technique for doing this, but these studies are also subject to many
criticisms, not the least of which are that they will not work for small changes to
governance that would not be material to shareholders. In addition, there may be
confounding variables and the results may be noisy and subject to design criticisms. For
individual firms, operational performance may make governance less salient or important
for shareholders.
Second, most of the studies of governance do not consider the value for a
particular firm or director, but rather involve the decisions by many firms on a particular
issue, like whether to have a classified board, whether to separate the role of chair and
CEO, and so forth. These studies, while valuable, suffer from the same problems
identified above, as well as endongeneity and causation direction concerns, and the
possibility that they cannot identify local maxima in broad trends.
The use of BSPs could help us better measure board performance separate from
the operational performance of the underlying firms. This would be possible, for example,
if a group of BSPs provided director services to multiple companies. The stock price of
the BSPs would reflect the market’s judgment about the quality of these services for a
basket of companies. Assuming that the operational performance of these companies was
not perfectly correlated, it would be possible to get a better estimate of the quality of
governance. Of course, this metric would be imperfect, as governance and operational
performance may be impossible to untangle perfectly. But market-traded BSPs would
give us more information about governance quality than the current “market” for director
services, which is not transparent and not priced directly by the market. To be sure,
directors occasionally serve many firms, and one could try to estimate the market value
of directors who do so. But the trend is against multiple directorships, and, in any event,
there is no market pricing in the way that publicly traded BSPs would be.
B. Board Functions
In the previous Section, we examine ways in which BSPs could help reduce the
pathologies of the current board model of corporate governance. We think the case is
strong that BSPs could, at least in some instances, deliver better corporate governance at
lower cost. In this Section, we offer some additional reasons that justify permitting
experimentation with the BSP model. These reasons track the discussion in Part II above,
where we discussed the functions played by the modern board: management, service, and
monitoring management. In each of these areas, the BSP has the potential to make
improvements or at least do no harm.
1. Managing the Firm
One of us has elsewhere argued that corporate law favored multimember boards
because groups are better at the sort of critical evaluative judgment that characterizes

51
most board decisions than are individuals. 264 While it might seem that a BSP might
undermine this by consolidating the multi-member board into a single decision making
point, this is not necessarily the case. If the client opted to have multiple representatives
of the BSP serve as its board (or on a mixed 265 board), the board itself would continue to
function as a group decision maker. If the client opted for the pure BSP model, the team
within the BSP servicing that client would continue to use group decision making as part
of its process. In short, in both cases multiple individuals will be analyzing and voting,
either directly or indirectly, on a particular course of conduct. We see no reason why this
group decision making process need take place among sole proprietors serving as board
members instead of among employees of a BSP. Furthermore, as noted in Part V below,
state corporate law has moved away from a requirement that boards consist of multiple
members, and this suggests that the group decision making benefits may not alone justify
the statutory bar on BSPs.
At the same time, for the reasons discussed in Part IV.A above, we expect that
BSPs would make better decisions than current boards. They would have better
information, access to specialists with fewer conflicted interests, more person-hours
available for exercising judgment, better incentives, and so on. The BSP thus combines
the advantages of group decision making with a group composition likely to be better
informed and motivated.
2. Providing Services
As noted in Part II above, board members provide various services to their clients,
including access to capital, information about industries, experience as CEOs, and so
forth. But this alone cannot justify a bar on the use of BSPs. It is possible that particular
BSP may not be able to provide as diverse a set of networks as can a multi-member board
of unrelated individuals. For some firms, the importance of, say, access to a network of
investors, may be sufficient to outweigh the benefits of hiring a BSP. For that firm, for
that particular time in its life cycle, there is nothing in our proposal that requires the use
of a BSP. Moreover, we see no obvious reason, however, why a BSP may not be able to
provide these services. For one, modern day consulting firms and investment banks
provide important networks of information and access for companies without relying on
individual contracts as in the board model. Large BSPs comprised of hundreds or
thousands of professionals, including many individuals currently serving as board
members, could likely do the same thing. If current or former CEOs are valuable
members of companies’ decision making process, their services will be demanded by
BSPs, who could hire them on a permanent or ad hoc basis. Finally, where this is not
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feasible, a BSP could serve as a matchmaker between clients, just as invest banks often
do. 266

One final point is worth mentioning. While the current composition of boards
may be optimal, opening up new possibilities through the BSP innovation may reveal
benefits previously unappreciated. BSP may be superior to current boards at advising
CEOs, since the BSP will have better information, better incentives, and specialists at call.
While one might object that if this were the case, companies would already be deploying
them, as we note below, the current situation may be an artifact of law and the stickiness
of the status quo more than a reflection of a first-best equilibrium.
3. Monitoring Management
The final key function of modern boards is to serve as a monitor of management.
In this role, there is an argument that corporate law favors multi-member boards because
such boards provide a mechanism for horizontal monitoring that solves the monitoring
problems inherent in a vertical hierarchy:
A hierarchy of individuals whose governance structures contemplate only
vertical monitoring cannot resolve the problem of who watches the
watchers. Instead, it seems the vicious circle can be broken by placing a
group at the apex of the hierarchy. Where an individual autocrat would
have substantial freedom to shirk or self-deal, the internal dynamics of
group governance may constrain self-dealing and shirking by individual
team members and, perhaps, even by the group as a whole. Within a
production team, for example, mutual monitoring and peer pressure
provide a coercive back- stop for a set of interpersonal relationships
founded on trust and other noncontractual social norms. 267
As with the board’s managerial functions, a BSP contains mechanisms for group decision
making that help replicate the advantages current boards receive from organizing as a
group. Likewise, the enhanced incentives and superior motivation associated with a BSP
should help it be a superior monitor compared to current boards for the reasons discussed
above.
V. BSPs and the Law
Current law provides numerous obstacles to effecting our proposal, all of which
therefore require rethinking. The most obvious hurdle is the requirement of state
corporate law that directors be natural persons. The Delaware General Corporation Law,
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for example, flatly states that each member of the board of directors “shall be a natural
person.” 268 The Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) affects the same result in a
somewhat more roundabout fashion. Section 8.03 states that a board “must consist of one
or more individuals,” 269 while § 1.40(13) defines individual as “a natural person.” 270 In
either case, “legal persons,” such as corporations and other forms of business
organization, clearly cannot serve as members of a board or as a replacement for the
board. 271 Even if a firm wanted to hire a BSP to provide board services and be
accountable under state law for board decisions, they could not do so, even with
shareholder approval. The natural-person requirement thus falls into a very small
category of mandatory corporate law rules. As we will show below, we think it does not
deserve such special treatment.
The listing requirements of the various stock exchanges follow state law. This
makes logical sense, since it would be odd for the requirements of being a public
company to be incompatible with the state law requirements for being a lawful company.
It is for this reason that listing requirements have typically served to narrow the range of
potential governance arrangements, rather than broadening them beyond what is
otherwise legal. For instance, the NYSE Listed Company Manual requires the board of
any listed company to be composed of a “majority of independent directors,” 272 and the
independence test requires the director have “has no material relationship with the listed
company (either directly or as a partner, shareholder or officer of an organization that has
a relationship with the company). 273 In addition, the listing rules require boards to have
compensation, audit, and nomination committees of the board, all with a majority of
independent directors. 274 The rules also implicitly contemplate that directors shall be
natural persons by drawing a distinction between “persons or organizations.” 275 Taken
together, these rules seem difficult to reconcile with a model in which an entity serves the
entire board function.
Federal law also seems to presume service by individual directors acting as sole
proprietors. Although no statute specifically requires directors to be natural persons, the
premise of recent reforms following the accounting scandals of the early 2000s and the
financial crisis of the late 2000s is service by individual directors acting alone. For
instance, the rules implementing the Securities Exchange Act, as amended by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, require “independent directors” to constitute a majority of firm audit
committees, and the definitions of independence seem to envision individuals acting
alone. 276 The response to board failures to monitor firm accounting practices was to make
sure board members were more independent of the firm and each other. A similar
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approach was taken in the Dodd-Frank Act in response to allegedly irresponsible
compensation practices at publicly traded firms during the run up to the financial crisis.
For instance, Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to direct the stock
exchanges to adopt listing rules requiring greater independence for board members
serving on compensation committees. 277 The statute, SEC rules, and listing requirements
all accept the sole-proprietor model of board service. 278
The case for effecting the necessary legal change is fairly straightforward. State
corporate law statutes consist mostly of default rules that can be changed by firm
owners. 279 State law thus provides an off-the-rack set of default rules regarding basic
corporate law, but generally allows firms to vary widely in their approach, so long as the
divergences are set forth in the corporate charter, and are effectuated in ways consistent
with law (for example, done with shareholder consent). 280 For instance, the Delaware
statute provides that firms shall be managed by a board of directors, “except as may be
otherwise provided . . . its certificate of incorporation.” 281 It is curious that Delaware thus
allow corporations to substantially modify the role of the board of directors—and even to
opt out of the board model—but mandates that boards consist solely of natural persons.
In contrast, our reform brings the statutory rules governing boards even closer into
alignment with the fundamental enabling principle of state corporate law.
Viewed in that way, several analogous legal developments suggest themselves.
First, unincorporated entities (that is, partnerships, LLCs, and the like) are typically
permitted to have business associations serve in the management role played by a
corporate board of directors for corporate entities. For instance, limited partnerships are
managed under the direction of the general partner, and state laws typically permit
limited partnerships to have corporations or other business entities serving as their
general partner. 282 The policy of allowing non-natural persons to manage the affairs of
partnerships is designed to encourage free contracting, which allows governance to be
277

http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/corporategovernance.shtml
Although changing state law, federal law, and stock exchange listing rules may seem like a
daunting task, the linkage between these rules makes the case more straightforward. If state laws were
amended to allow firms to serve as directors, the change would cascade through the rest of the various
corporate governance rules at the state, federal, and private regulator level. State law sets the baseline from
which all of these other statutes and rules, both private and public, operate. For instance, independence
requirements of federal law and the exchanges could be met simply by ensuring that the company and the
BSP were not under common control. Some tweaks might be required here and there, but it would not
require much beyond amending the underlying state corporate law.
279
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 15
(1992); Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory Nature of the ALI Code, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 984, 989-91
(1993).
280
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 279, at 2 (explaining that “enabling statute[s] allow[]
managers and investors to write their own tickets, to establish systems of governance without substantive
scrutiny from a regulator”).
281
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a)
282
See Larry E. Ribstein, An Applied Theory of Limited Partnership, 37 Emory L.J. 837, 868-71
(1988) (discussing incorporated general partners). The Delaware Limited Partnership Act defines a
“general partner” as “a person who is named as a general partner in the certificate of limited partnership . .
.,” 6 Del. Code § 17-101(5), and then “person,” as “a natural person, partnership . . ., limited liability
company, . . ., corporation . . . or any other individual or entity.” Id. at § 17-101(14). See generally Robert
W. Hamilton, Corporate General Partners of Limited Partnerships, 1 J. Small & Emerging Bus. Law 73
(1997) (noting the availability of corporate general partners).
278

55
tailored to particular circumstances and to permit more complete markets. 283 The driving
force, however, is limited liability. 284 Many limited partnerships in Delaware and
elsewhere take advantage of this flexibility to use firms as board equivalents. This
suggests that there is a latent demand for governance to be performed by business entities,
instead of individuals, for some companies. The same rules apply for other
unincorporated entities, such as limited liability companies and business trusts. Indeed,
the Delaware LLC Act and the Delaware Statutory Trusts Act are based on the Limited
Partnership Act, and permit business associations of all sorts to serve in the managerial or
board of directors analog role. 285
Second, the definition of “director” in the Investment Company Act includes
incorporated entities. Section 2 of the ICA defines a director as “any director of a
corporation or any person performing similar functions with respect to any organization,
whether incorporated or unincorporated . . ..” 286 In Chabot v. Empire Trust Co., the
Second Circuit held an incorporated investment company manager was a director for
purposes of the ICA. 287 In so holding the court noted that Empire, the corporate entity in
the case, was empowered by the trust certificate to act with all the powers of a typical
director, and this therefore brought it within the definition in the ICA. 288 The fact that
Empire was a corporation was not a barrier to it acting like or, for purposes of the ICA,
being treated as a director. What mattered to the court was function, not form, and so
long as the corporation was acting as a director would, the law would consider it a
director.
Third, the Supreme Court has construed portions of the securities laws broadly to
include corporations acting as directors. In Blau v. Lehman, the Supreme Court held that
for purposes of liability under the short-swing profit rule in § 16(b), a corporation may be
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treated as a director if it effectively deputized a natural person to perform its duties on the
board. 289 The Court noted that whether a company is a director by deputation is “a
question of fact to be settled case by case and not a conclusion of law.” 290 The takeaway
from this case is that if the policy rationale behind a particular law would be served by
treating a corporation as a director, then courts will be willing to look at what the entity
was doing rather than whether it was an individual.
Fourth, policy considerations have led most states to abandon the requirement that
boards have multiple members, thus opening up the possibility of corporations or other
business associations serving the board function through a single seat. Until 1969,
Delaware required that the board of directors of corporations with more than three
shareholders have a minimum of three members. 291 In 1969, however, the Delaware
General Corporation Law was amended to permit all corporations to have single-member
boards. 292 The MBCA likewise permits single-member boards. 293 The shift to permitting
single-member boards was driven by concerns about the governance of close
corporations. As the drafters of the Model Act explain, requiring close corporations with
one or two shareholders to have a minimum of three directors could “require the
introduction” to the board “of persons with no financial interest in the corporation.” 294
But we think the application of this logic could easily be extended to accommodate our
proposal for BSPs. Since states are willing to forego the advantages of multi-member
boards by allowing single-member boards, they ought to be willing to allow a BSP to
serve as that single member. 295
Fifth, the bankruptcy code permits corporate entities to serve in roles analogous to
the board of directors. Trustees are empowered by the code to represent and manage the
estate as would the board of directors. 296 Section 321 then sets for the eligibility
requirements for trustees: “a) A person may serve as trustee in a case under this title only
if such person is—. . . (2) a corporation authorized by such corporation’s charter or
bylaws to act as trustee, and, in a case under chapter 7, 12, or 13 of this title, having an
office in at least one of such districts.” 297
As these examples suggest, hiring a firm to provide board or board-like services is
not as radical a change as it may appear at first glance. To the contrary, this precise
model is permitted in many related areas. The inescapable conclusion from this set of
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examples is that legislators, courts, and other regulators are willing to accept or even
encourage corporate entities to act as directors or boards when the firms are serving
director functions and the policy rationale for a particular application (such as the insidertrading rules) warrant such treatment. In short, where there are good policy reasons to
tolerate BSPs, we see the law tolerating them. We see no reason why the same should not
be true for BSPs of reporting corporations.
VI. Extensions
In this Part, we consider a few potential modifications or extensions of the
Boards-R-Us model of corporate governance. The examples below demonstrate the
flexibility of the model to achieve various and disparate governance ends. We
demonstrate how the BSP could be used to achieve greater shareholder power or greater
managerial power, for example, depending on how it is deployed. Our point here is to
show that the BSP is just a tool, not a means towards a particular end result. We believe
that it is potentially very useful tool, however, as using the BSP model likely will allow
various governance innovations to be implemented at lower overall cost and with greater
transparency and accountability than the current model.
A. Shareholder Access to the Proxy
As a theoretical matter competition for board control could improve governance,
and thereby increase firm and social value. 298 A proxy contest that threatens to remove all
or part of the current board, and thus management as well, provides an incentive for
board members and managers to take care to avoid the contest, and therefore reduces
agency costs. 299 Under the current board model, however, there is a very limited threat of
a proxy fight. 300 This is because the competition for board seats is, because of its costs,
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currently embedded in the market for corporate control. 301 As noted above, anyone can
run for a board seat, but bearing the cost of identifying, contacting, lobbying, and tallying
the votes of shareholders is prohibitively expensive for the gain of a single board seat.
Accordingly, proxy contests are usually conducted only when those seeking control of
board are holders of large economic stakes in the firm, and therefore have more to gain
from controlling the board than just the cash flows from governance.
The Holy Grail for many corporate governance reformers thus has been obtaining
shareholder access to the corporate proxy. 302 Subject to varying restrictions and
exceptions, proxy access proposals typically would allow shareholders to nominate one
or more slates of directors whose names would be placed on the corporation’s proxy
card. 303 There is some evidence that giving shareholders access to the proxy to create
more governance competition would increase firm value. 304 The Dodd-Frank Act
accepted the premise of these proposals, and specifically authorized the SEC to adopt
rules that would allow shareholders greater access to the corporate proxy for purposes of
creating more competition for director seats. 305 In 2010, the SEC promulgated Rule 14a11, which gave shareholders (either individually or as a group) that have held at three
percent of a company’s voting shares for at least three years the right to include their
significant impetus for firms to make changes, such as replacing management and decreasing expenditures
that increase profitability and shareholder value. Vyacheslav Fos, “The Disciplinary Effect of Proxy
Contests,” Columbia Business School Working Paper (Jan. 2010). If the critics are correct, our proposal
could be used to achieve greater competition for board services. If the current amount of competition is
optimal, then it would likely do no harm, and would be able to achieve the same level of competition at
lower costs. The real virtue of our proposal, however, is that it could also make directors more insulated
from shareholder control, if that would be the optimal approach to governance.
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nominees for up to 25% of the available board seats in the company’s proxy materials. 306
The DC Circuit vacated the rule because the SEC failed to do a sufficient cost-benefit
analysis of the rule, 307 meaning shareholders still have to bear their own expense in
mounting a proxy battle.
Our proposal would open up the possibility of shareholder access to the proxy
without necessarily requiring a new SEC rule. The BSP model readily could be modified
to facilitate competitive board elections. To increase competition, corporations could
specify in their articles of incorporation a nomination and election process designed to
create competitive elections. One option would be for someone, say the CEO, to
nominate two (or more) firms to run at each annual shareholder meeting. Shareholders
would then choose a firm to serve as the board for that year. Annual turnover might be
too frequent, so one can imagine companies prescribing in advance a minimum term
(subject to removal by shareholder vote), such as three years.
This approach could be modified in numerous ways to make elections more or
less competitive, more or less under managerial control, and so forth. For instance, if
criticisms about excessive managerial control are true, in general or for a specific firm,
the process of choosing the firms competing to provide board services could be insulated
from managerial domination, either by statute (if the former) or by corporate charter (if
the latter). For example, firms could be required or permitted to have large shareholders
who have held their shares for a specified period nominate BSPs to stand for shareholder
election at the annual meeting. A minimum number of names, say, two, would be
submitted on the firm’s proxy materials to elect the BSP for that year (or longer, as the
case may be).
If the market did not give rise to the desired level of competition or shareholder
involvement, a state law or new SEC rule similar to Rule 14a-11 could be used to achieve
the desired result. Arguably, the objections to proxy access have less traction with respect
to BSPs than with respect to individual directors. As one of us has elsewhere articulated
them, those objections come in two general flavors. One is that proxy access inefficiently
shifts the locus of decision making about board composition to shareholders, who have an
informational disadvantage about the proper qualifications and fit of board members. 308
The other is that electing a minority of directors will lead to factions on the board
representing different shareholder interests, and this would impede board functioning and
decision making. 309 Although the BSP model still suffers to some extent from the first
problem, we think it likely shareholders will have better information about BSPs than
individual board candidates, especially if publicly held BSPs arise, so that the market can
price their skill set. The BSP model arguably does even more to reduce the magnitude of
the second objection, because it reduces the potential mischief of dissident directors
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elected off a short slate, while still using competition and shareholder voice to improve
governance.
B. Increasing Managerial Power
The flexibility of our proposal is demonstrated because one could alternatively
tweak the appointment and election rules to go not in the director of shareholder
empowerment but rather towards what one of us refers to as director primacy. 310 To
encourage an even more robust form of director primacy, while simultaneously reducing
the potential for shareholder disenfranchisement or abuse, one could imagine, say fixed
five-year board terms for BSPs with no removal during that period (except for cause) but
with mandatory rotation. 311 This idea builds off a proposal by Martin Lipton and Steven
Rosenblum for a quinquennial election for board members to give firm governance the
time and insulation from the pressures of short-term investors to focus on creating longterm shareholder value. 312 Combining this insulation with the idea of mandatory rotation
might look something like this: A company would nominate at least two BSPs to stand
for election. Shareholders would elect one to serve a set, say five-year, term. During that
five-year term, the BSP would have all the powers enumerated by Lipton and Rosenblum,
as well as the limitations they proposed. For instance, the board could not be removed
except for conduct that was illegal or amounted to gross malfeasance of duty. As such,
the board would have the power to resist any hostile takeovers, since its control of the
corporation for that period would be nearly absolute. Then, at the end of the five-year
term, the incumbent BSP would have to rotate off and a new BSP would be elected.
There is an analogy here to the mandatory rotation of auditors. After the
accounting scandals of the late 1990s-early 2000s, the idea of mandatory rotation of
auditors became a live issue. As of this writing, the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB) is considering mandatory rotation of auditors, such that an
audit firm would serve a maximum number of years before it would have to be replaced
by another firm. One can imagine adopting this approach for BSPs either alone or in
combination with other governance arrangements. For instance, a firm could put in its
charter or the legislature could require a mandatory rotation of BSPs after a set number of
years. The arguments here for and against such a requirement are straightforward, and are
similar to those now being debated by the PCAOB with respect to accountants. 313
Mandatory rotation has the benefit of reducing capture by managers, bringing new ideas,
and reducing agency costs. On the downside, any rule will be both overinclusive—
forcing out competent boards—and underinclusive—allowing incompetent boards to
remain in placing longer than they deserve. One might think that a company would have
the proper incentives to optimize how long a board stayed in place, thus making any
mandatory rule unnecessary. While we think there are reasons to doubt companies’
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incentives are perfect, in the absence of some significant experimentation, it is far too
early to propose a set time period as an optimal, assuming one exists across many firms.
The chief advantage of combining our idea with that of Lipton and Rosenblum is
that the virtues of BSPs help reduce the potential objections to their quinquennial election
proposal. BSPs would be more accountable, more agile and able, and more transparent in
terms of performance, thus reducing the risks from giving them free reign for a period of
five years. If courts impose stronger fiduciary duties on BSPs, as we expect, boards are
staffed with more capable individuals, board performance in terms of governance is
measured by the market, and BSPs have large reputational capital, there is less reason to
suspect that reducing shareholder oversight to once every five years would result in more
managerial slack or self-serving behavior.
***
There are undoubtedly countless other ways in which the board-services model
could be used to achieve corporate governance improvements or changes. We leave these
to future work and to the market for corporate governance to determine.
VII. Objections
In this Part, we briefly address two significant objections to our proposal. Some
may argue that our burden is a heavy one, because the limitation of eligibility to serve as
a corporate director to natural persons is ubiquitous and long standing. We have shown a
strong affirmative case for BSPs, however, and in this Part we show that the case against
them is surprisingly weak.
A. Limited Liability
One objection to our proposal is the potential mischief arising from allowing
board services to be provided behind a cloak of limited liability. Although commentators
generally agree that fiduciary duties are an imperfect mechanism for policing corporate
decision making, the concern would be that legalizing BSPs would further undermine
whatever work the duty of care and loyalty are now doing. As mentioned above, there are
two countervailing impacts of limited liability for directors. On the one hand, limited
liability could be thought to decrease the incentives for the directors to take care, since its
owners will not be liable beyond their capital contribution. On the other hand, there are
well-known benefits of limited liability, which make it widely accepted for the provision
of all types of goods and services. Limited liability may make judgments against
corporate entities more likely because judgments against limited liability firms may be
more acceptable to courts. Limited liability also encourages shareholder investment, since
investors need not worry about their private wealth being endangered and do not have to
worry about monitoring each other to reduce the risks of joint and several liability.
We’ve addressed much of this concern above, showing how the use of
corporations as boards is likely to increase legal and non-legal constraints on board
misconduct. For instance, large BSPs will be composed of numerous individuals with
human capital and reputational assets in the firm, and these will be lost if the BSP fails.
This reputation multiplier has been shown to do significant work in reducing opportunism

62
by firms. So here we will take on another related objection—the infinite regress
problem. 314 A firm serving as the board of another firm, and so on through many layers
could result in liability being dissipated completely in corporate shells. We can think of
the problem as suggesting the need for some individual to ultimately be liable for the
conduct of any firm. This is, however, an objection about limited liability generally, as it
would equally apply to the current rules allowing the general partner of a limited
partnership to incorporate, not about limited liability in the context of BSPs.
In all cases in which limited liability is used, moreover, there are mechanisms in
place to help reduce the chance that the corporate fiction is used to deliberately shield
misconduct. First, private ordering could ameliorate this problem. There is nothing that
prevents companies that hire BSPs from requiring these firms be well capitalized, have
insurance or post a bond, or agree to be bound by fiduciary duties that run to the owners
of the BSP. Reputation can also play a complimentary role, since both the hiring firm and
the BSP are likely repeat players with incentives not to cheat. It is the combination of
contract and monitoring by investors and consumers that provides the primary
mechanism for reducing the downside of limited liability in other areas, and it can do
some work here too.
Second, there are legal tools available to catch those cases in which private
ordering and market mechanisms fail to prevent fraud and abuse enabled by limited
liability. Piercing the corporate veil, for example, is available to hold the owners of a firm
personally liable in cases in which the courts determine the use of a corporate form is
effectively just a fraud designed to externalize costs onto others. 315
Piercing could be used in the case of BSPs, as it is used when firms provide other
products and services. If a BSP met the test that justified piercing—e.g., thinly
capitalized, disregards corporate formalities, etc.—then holding owners liable would be
possible. Thus, if a BSP were merely designed to reduce liability in an individual case
without any of the offsetting benefits, the firm would be disregarded and the individual
owners of the firm would be liable. Consider, for instance, a group of ten directors that
formed a corporation solely for the purpose of avoiding liability. Assuming a company
would hire them to provide board services without any guarantees, the BSP could,
without veil piercing, lead to a worse outcome. But, if the directors put no capital into the
firm and do not respect the legal difference between the firm and the individuals, courts
would have no trouble holding the individual directors liable. 316
Delaware precedents support this argument. In cases in which entities have served
as in roles similar to boards, the courts will disregard the entity when necessary to avoid
allowing the entity to serve merely as a way of externalizing harm or reaping private
benefits for those behind the entity. For instance, in In re USACafes, L.P. Litigation, the
court looked through a partnership entity serving in a quasi-director role to individuals
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behind the entity. 317 In that case, the limited partners of USACafes, L.P., sued the
directors of USACafes General Partner, Inc., its corporate general partner, for breach of
fiduciary duty. The directors of the general partner held 47% of the limited partnership
interests and owned 100% the stock of the corporate general partner. In the challenged
transaction, the partnership sold its assets to a third party, which made a $15 million side
payment to the directors of the general partner that was allegedly a breach of duty to the
limited partners. The defendants argued that while the general partner owed fiduciary
duties to the limited partners, “the members of the board of the corporate general partner
only owed fiduciary duties to its stockholders, not to the limited partners.” The court
rejected this argument, extending fiduciary duties to the individuals behind the legal
entity serving as the manager of the partnership. The court deployed the equitable
tradition of looking to where control actually resided, and held that “[w]hen control over
corporate property was recognized to be in the hands of the shareholders who controlled
the enterprise, the fiduciary duty was found to extend to such persons as well.” 318
This was necessary to avoid allowing a manager, like a general partner or BSP, to
engage in a self-dealing transaction at whim. Another court described it this way:
Consider, for example, a classic self-dealing transaction: assume that a
majority of the board of the corporate general partner formed a new entity
and then caused the general partner to sell partnership assets to the new
entity at an unfairly small price, injuring the partnership and its limited
partners. Can it be imagined that such persons have not breached a duty to
the partnership itself? And does it not make perfect sense to say that the
gist of the offense is a breach of the equitable duty of loyalty that is placed
upon a fiduciary? 319
The USACafes doctrine has been extended to other analogous situations, such as the
managers of LLCs and statutory trusts. 320
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The key point to recognize is that the arguments for limited liability for most
businesses translate well to the provision of director services. If one believes the virtues
of limited liability outweigh the costs for regular business activities, like oil refining,
pharmaceutical design, and air travel, then this calculus should have the same bite for the
provision of director services. Directors acting through a corporate entity are akin to the
shareholders protected by limited liability: they could worry less about risk, would not
have to monitor each other, and so on. Limited liability thus serves as a rough analogy to
risk pooling, which is a key benefit of our proposal.
B. Sticky Equilibria
Another objection is that firms are risk averse when it comes to governance
innovations, 321 and therefore even if legislators permitted non-natural persons to serve as
directors, the current model might be quite resilient, even if not optimal. As a practical
matter, we know of no company that has challenged this requirement or lobbied to try to
change it. This is not necessarily an indication that some firms might not benefit from
such a change. Any firm that wanted to change the rule would have to bear all of the
costs of lobbying or litigation, as well as the uncertainty in the market as the innovation
were tried out, but would not be able to capture all of the upside relative to its
competitors, who, after all, could simply adopt the new approach once it was accepted.322
So although we are not certain there would be demand for board services provided by
firms as opposed to individuals, we do not think the absence of them is evidence of the
lack of demand. The current equilibrium may be a suboptimal one and not the only
possible one.
The sticky equilibrium issue may be especially problematic, however, for two
reasons. First, many of the benefits from the Boards-R-Us model of governance may be
only available or especially available if large BSPs exist and are competing in a robust
market for board services. There are many vested interests whose fortunes are tied to the
current arrangement, and we expect they will resist upsetting the current equilibrium. As
with the creation of any new market or industry out of existing ones, there will be
transition costs, given the increase in uncertainty and need for experimentation and
learning in the short run.
Second, in jurisdictions in which corporate entities were permitted to serve as
boards or in board-like roles, BSPs did not arise naturally. For instance, in Hong Kong,
unlisted private companies unaffiliated with listed companies were until recently able to
have corporate directors. The experience in Hong Kong was not a good one. According to
a report by the Standing Committee on Company Law Reform, which proposed
eliminating incorporated directors, the use of corporate directors had two problems: the
corporation delegated as director changed with frequency, making “it very difficult to
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know who was responsible for the conduct of the business of a company”; and the lack of
a person as a director made attaching liability to the director more difficult. 323 For
reasons discussed above, these concerns are not significant in a world with BSPs, but the
creation of a market for governance is important to reducing their potential negative
impact. We are confident that the robust activism of US capital markets and the
prominent role played today by investors and stakeholders in governance is sufficiently
different from that in Hong Kong and the other jurisdictions in which corporate
directorships (of a variety) have been tried.
While our goal in this Paper is not to plot the precise way forward as a practical
matter, we think there is significant potential for vertical integration of the board services
industry to generate profitable opportunities for BSPs. In addition, the existence of
existing firms in this space—serving as consultants and advisors to existing soleproprietor board members—means that the costs of vertical integration are lower than if
new firms had to be created to start the industry from scratch. The current corporate
governance space is replete with activist shareholders, investors, good-governance
advocates, and pension funds all of which may have an incentive to experiment with the
BSP model, either by creating one or by pushing companies to adopt them. If this is
insufficient, some encouragement or experimentation might be warranted. There is a
literature on point, 324 and we will not repeat the arguments here. We’ve argued for BSPs,
both as a matter of theory and practice, and therefore think the case for them is strong
enough to support steps to make them a reality.
One mechanism for achieving some movement in the direction of a robust market
for BSPs is the possibility that a court could hold managers of a particular firm liable for
failing to consider, if not hire, a BSP. 325 If we are correct that hiring a BSP could bring
substantial governance improvements, then for an underperforming company with an
entrenched board, the failure to open the board up to competition from a BSP or a move
to shut out a BSP from competing for control of the board could be viewed as a violation
of managers’ and board members’ fiduciary duties.
C. Special Interest Representatives
One may object that the use of a BSP would make it more difficult for particular
individuals to serve on corporate boards. We noted above how the BSP model could
accommodate the hiring of individuals with valuable connections, be they political,
personal, financial, managerial, or otherwise. 326 If a particular individual, say, the
daughter of a political leader, would make a valuable addition to the board of a particular
firm, that same person could be hired by the BSP to work on the team serving the board
function for that particular firm. This is true regardless of what value a particular
individual is providing.
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Here, however, we address a particular objection, which is that institutional
investors occasionally nominate board members in order to influence governance of a
particular firm. 327 Although it is contestable whether such special-interest directors add
value, 328 assuming that they do, one could read our proposal as effectively stripping
investors of the ability to nominate board members, and therefore of the board’s ability to
directly represent a diverse set of interests. If one believes that the board serves as an
intermediating function for heterogeneous shareholder preferences, then this could be a
significant cost of a move to BSPs. Even if special-interest directors are not always a
positive for firms, they may be in some cases, and the hiring of a BSP could lead to the
flight of institutional capital, especially where it would serve as a valuable constraint on
management failures.
There are several responses. First, this is just one cost that must be weighed
against the benefits of the BSP model. It may be, for instance, that the gains from
increase competition for board seats are sufficient that the need for special institutional
shareholder board seats is reduced or eliminated. After all, if institutional shareholders
seek board representation solely as a mechanism for disciplining bad boards, an overall
improvement in boards through the use of BSPs may obviate the need for special
representation. Further, we would expect these decisions of costs and benefits to be made
by firms in the market for investor capital. If firms internalize the costs of governance,
which we have every reason to believe, then they have the right incentives to maximize
this tradeoff.
Second, special access to board processes for important firm stakeholders, be they
investors or unions or the government, can be achieved by contract. If an institutional
investor wants to access to information or to be able to monitor management, it could
contract with the company for this right, much as creditors contract with firms using
various covenants that give them access to information or types of control. Alternatively
investors could intermediate their access or monitoring role through the BSP, by
contracting with the BSP for the information or monitoring function to be fulfilled by the
BSP.
Third, if contracting with either the firm or the BSP is costly or impossible, the
investor could sponsor their own BSP to compete against the current board for the board
service function. In a world in which the costs of changing or improving firm governance
are lowered dramatically by this option, the value of special interest access to the board is
greatly diminished.
D. The Value of Personal Leadership
There is also a Burkean objection that we’ve alluded to above: that is, the longstanding tradition of individual directors may suggest a deep wisdom about personal
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service that would be lost in the move to the BSP model. The objection would go
something like this. Not only have boards since the days of the Dutch East India
Company been composed of individual sole-proprietorships, but board members may
also simply be another category of leader that we think of as necessarily being an
individual. For instance, the Constitution requires the president to be an individual person,
and it would seem strange to suggest that we hire Presidents-R-Us to be president, even
though many of the arguments advanced above could apply to that situation as well. The
same could be said about a variety of leaders, from mayors to law school deans.
One response is that our proposal is about corporate directors, not political leaders,
and the cost-benefit calculation may be quite different in those cases. For instance, firms
have to compete in various markets, and these provide discipline for bad governance
choices in ways that political leaders do not feel as intensely. We pick a president every
four years, whereas the governance of Microsoft is priced every second.
Another response is that boards are different than the president or the law school
dean because of the nature of the role they play. While it might make sense to hire a firm
to be a dean or a president, there is something personal about leadership in these cases
that is not as true in the board context. Individuals feel invested in the personal
connection with political leaders for reasons deep in the human psyche, but it is difficult
to imagine that any corporate stakeholder – be it an employee, customer, or investor –
feels this way about a particular board member or the board as a whole. It is possible that
some CEOs serve this function, and that this may make the use of a firm to provide CEO
services more problematic, but it is hard to see this value for the board. As noted above,
the board provides a variety of functions, none of which is about the kind of personal
leadership that we commonly associate with individual leaders.
A final response is to point out that the use of boards is largely a product of
historical path dependency, and that the reasons for its initial use no longer obtain as
firmly as they once did. Professor Franklin Gevurtz traces the origin of corporate boards
back to medieval guilds and towns, concluding that corporate board antecedents where “a
reflection of political practices and ideas widespread in Western Europe in the late
Middle Ages.” 329 Gevurtz’s detailed historical account concludes that the reason
corporate boards developed was in order to give “political legitimacy” to corporate
activity. 330 While the article concludes with a sop to modern defenders of boards and
greater shareholder participation in corporate affairs, there is nothing about our idea that
would upset the idea of “consent through elected representatives” continuing as part of
the corporate tradition. In fact, our proposal is likely to increase the political legitimacy
of corporate boards by opening up possibilities for more transparent and active
participation of shareholders in deciding who will represent their interests in supervising
corporate management.
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E. Other Objections
A couple of other potential objections are worth mentioning briefly. First, one
may argue that for the BSP model to work well, BSPs will have to provide service to
more than one company, and this will create conflict of interest problems. While this is
obviously true, it is not an insurmountable problem. Other service firms, such as those
providing accounting, legal, and consulting services, have access to proprietary
information and significant power to influence corporate behavior in ways that could
raise significant conflict problems if serving rival firms. These firms nevertheless have
developed tools and procedures that enable them to convince their clients that they are
able to minimize the potential losses from any conflicts. We would expect BSPs to do so
as well, perhaps simply parroting the tried-and-true techniques used by law firms and the
like for years. BSPs who do this well will thrive, and those who do not will die off. In
addition, there are existing laws that will do work here, such as those banning certain
informed trades by insiders or constructive insiders. These have been used against board
members, most famously in the recent case of Rajat Gupta, who used his position as a
board member at Goldman Sachs to enrich himself and others based on private
information. 331 Reputational sanctions will do work here as well. Professionalism may
too, since, as noted above, the creation of BSPs may create a new class of professional
directors. If this happens, a professional organization, akin to those found in other areas
like law, accounting, and brokerage services, may arise to enforce soft-law norms of
conduct in this area. 332
Second, there is the possibility that BSPs may complicate the takeover market. On
the one hand, a more independent BSP would be expected to be more amenable to a
valuable takeover offer, and the transparency of a large corporation would make any kind
of side deals less likely. On the other hand, the potential loss of business to a particular
BSP from a merger – e.g., if the acquirer wants to install their own BSP or board – could
mean a BSP could oppose a merger that would increase shareholder value. While this is
possible, this is also true about current boards. Moreover, insofar as a BSP would have
increased financial incentives tied to the value of the underlying company, this conflict
could be reduced relative to the current board model. In addition, BSPs that develop
reputations for opposing valuable mergers may find their brand diminished in what we
expect will be a vigorous market for board control. Finally, there are existing legal
mechanisms, such as fiduciary duty suits common today in mergers, to police egregious
board reluctant or entrenchment in the face of a valuable acquisition offer.
Finally, one might argue that there is value in independent deliberation by
individual board members, and this will be lost if those providing board services are all
working for a single firm that has hiring and firing authority over them. Like other
objections, however, this is just a cost to be weighed against the benefits of BSPs. There
is also reason to believe this concern is overblown. The current board model puts
enormous authority over directors in the hands of a single individual – the CEO – and it
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is not obvious why this is a superior mechanism for eliciting independent judgment and
deliberation than if those doing the deciding work for a firm instead. Moreover, if it is
valuable to have independence in this way, there are solutions within the BSP model.
BSPs can organize as partnerships or LLPs, and thus replicate the board deliberation
model at the top of the BSP. Deliberation and independent judgment could also be built
into the way in which BSPs staff projects, and, as noted above, one would expect this to
be a dimension on which BSPs would try to differentiate their services. BSPs that can
best replicate the value, if any, that exists in the current board model will thrive and be
able to charge more for their services. One last point is worth making. The value of
independence and individual deliberation may be situational, and something that a BSP
could buy in the spot market for particular transactions. This would be an analogy to
boards’ current use of “special committees” of independent directors in final-period
transactions, like mergers. If in a particular transaction or for a particular firm there is a
need for independent deliberation by individuals unaffiliated with the company or the
BSP, such individuals could be hired by the BSP to provide this value on an ad hoc basis.

VIII. Conclusion
Professional director services are statutorily required to be personal service
contracts. This is extremely odd, yet widely accepted by corporations and corporate
observers. We know of no other service provided for corporations that is obligated by law
to be performed by a sole proprietorship, and for good reason. Lawyers, consultants,
accountants, doctors, and so on, all associate with each other to form corporate entities to
provide their services for a host of well understood reasons. Business associations allow
for risk sharing, for investments in training and information, for capturing economies of
scale, and for increased accountability through greater reputational stakes and better
judicial supervision. If the state law requirement that board members be “natural persons,”
were amended to permit all legal persons, including partnerships, LLCs, and corporations,
to provide them, we believe the market for directors and for governance could be
fundamentally improved. A market for corporate governance, separate and distinct from
the market for corporate control, could arise that would have the power to make boards
the true fulcrum of corporate governance that the law presumes they are or should be.
Board services could become a true market, with competition bringing the expected
benefits of better service at lower cost.
Our proposal is consistent with the spirit of state corporate law as a set of default
rules that merely enable firms to create their own governance arrangements designed to
generate local maxima. Mandatory rules are the exception, not the rule, and should be
based on clear and convincing evidence that freedom of contract would be unlikely to
lead to social welfare improvements. We believe such a case is not made, and, in fact, the
opposite is true. In addition, there are a variety of contexts in which law, including state
and federal law, already tolerates corporate entities serving in a board or board-like role.
Partnerships, for instance, can have any legal person serving in the board-like role of
general partner. Extending this right to corporations seems like a logical next step.
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This is not to argue that all firms should hire other firms to provide their board
services. We doubt one-size-fits-all arguments generally, and are confident that such a
rule here would be hopelessly overbroad. Firms should merely have a choice, subject to
the constraints of the market and judicial review for opportunism in the use of
corporations to provide these services. As we’ve shown, the Boards-R-Us idea is one that
could be used to achieve a host of governance ends, ranging from increased shareholder
power to better director primacy over corporations. In either case, and all those in
between, what our proposal does is increase the transparency and competition for board
services in a way that should increase confidence that firm choices about the role of the
board are ones that are in the interests of shareholders and society in general, rather than
based on a hidden agenda.
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